The Epistemological Status of Knowledge About God in Basran Muʿtazilism: Ashāb al-maʿārif’s Conception of Necessary Knowledge and Its Critique by Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār

Hayrettin Nebi Güdekli

Makale detayları

The Epistemological Status of Knowledge About God in Basran Muʿtazilism: Ashāb al-maʿārif’s Conception of Necessary Knowledge and Its Critique by Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār

Yazarlar:

Hayrettin Nebi Güdekli

Yayıncı:

Eskişehir Osmangazi University

Ana Başlıklar:

Kelam

Dergi:

Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi Vol.12 Issue 2, pp.699-722

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

9/2025

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001357940

pISSN:

2147-8171

Anahtar kelimeler:

Özet:

 The traditional approach of theologians in general and Muʿtazilite theologians in particular to the problem of the nature of knowledge of God is that such knowledge is attained through reasoning nazar. However, among the Muʿtazilites, the Ashāb al-maʿārif, led by theologians such as al-Sumāmah b. Ashras, ʿAlī al-Aswārī, and al-Jāḥiẓ, raised the problem of the inferential nature of knowledge of God and departed from the traditional Muʿtazilite approach by arguing that this kind of knowledge occurs naturally in human beings and is necessary. This approach of the Ashāb al-maʿārif was a consequence of their belief that all knowledge arises naturally from human beings. Ashāb al-maʿārif tried to justify his view of natural knowledge with arguments. Although al-Jāḥiẓs approach has a basis within the framework of his understanding of nature, it seems that the main justification for his approach is the idea that we cannot be held responsible for reasoning about God without having prior knowledge of Him. Al-Jāḥiẓ derived the following paradox from the statement The reasoning that leads to the knowledge of God is obligatory: How can we be held responsible for the reasoning that leads us to know God when we dont yet know Him? According to this objection, al-Jāḥiẓ concluded that we must have prior knowledge of that for which we are responsible for reasoning, and consequently claimed that knowledge of God must be natural and necessary. The problem of whether knowledge of God comes naturally to man or through reasoning and reflection seems to have been the subject of long-lasting debates among theologians. The theologians of the Basra Muʿtazilites paid special attention to criticizing the approach of the ashāb al-maʿarif. In this context, Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār rejected al-Jāḥiẓs argument that peoples knowledge of God must be naturally occurring and argued that peoples knowledge of God is the result of their mental activity. Accordingly, knowledge of God is acquired through reasoning and thinking. Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār argues that if all knowledge, including knowledge of God, is considered naturally occurring and necessary, then individuals have no role in creating knowledge. Moreover, this idea not only renders reasoning as an act meaningless but also undermines the understanding of human agency. For we know that the actions of others and ourselves are caused by a dāʿīmotive and not by a counter-dāʿī sārif. Therefore, the fact that our actions are realized according to our intentionwill and dāʿīs, and not according to our counter-will kerāhāt and counter-dāʿī sāwārif shows that reasoning is also an act of ours. On the other hand, to argue that knowledge of God occurs naturally in the individual would mean that people are born with this knowledge. If people innately knew Gods existence, there should be no disagreement about Gods existence. However, people have different views on the existence of God, which shows that al-Jāḥiẓs claim is false. Furthermore, to say that knowledge of God occurs in a person without any role on his part would also make it impossible to explain his religious responsibility. Based on these reasons, Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār followed the traditional ideas of Muʿtazilite theology by trying to show that knowledge of God, like other moral actions, comes from peoples free will and is a result of thinking, meaning that this knowledge is based on reasoning rather than being something everyone has to know. This article will discuss the debate among the theologians of the Basra Muʿtazilites regarding the nature of knowledge of God. For this purpose, we will first examine the path leading to the opinion of the Ashāb al-maʿārif and discuss the idea of nature, will, and act. Then, we will present the arguments of the Ashāb al-maʿārif that knowledge of God is naturalnecessary and investigate how these arguments are criticized by Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār. Finally, we will examine his counterarguments against the Ashāb al-maʿārif and discuss how he shows that this kind of knowledge is the result of human mental activity. In the conclusion, we will end the article with a comparison of both approaches.

 The traditional approach of theologians in general and Muʿtazilite theologians in particular to the problem of the nature of knowledge of God is that such knowledge is attained through reasoning nazar. However, among the Muʿtazilites, the Ashāb al-maʿārif, led by theologians such as al-Sumāmah b. Ashras, ʿAlī al-Aswārī, and al-Jāḥiẓ, raised the problem of the inferential nature of knowledge of God and departed from the traditional Muʿtazilite approach by arguing that this kind of knowledge occurs naturally in human beings and is necessary. This approach of the Ashāb al-maʿārif was a consequence of their belief that all knowledge arises naturally from human beings. Ashāb al-maʿārif tried to justify his view of natural knowledge with arguments. Although al-Jāḥiẓs approach has a basis within the framework of his understanding of nature, it seems that the main justification for his approach is the idea that we cannot be held responsible for reasoning about God without having prior knowledge of Him. Al-Jāḥiẓ derived the following paradox from the statement The reasoning that leads to the knowledge of God is obligatory: How can we be held responsible for the reasoning that leads us to know God when we dont yet know Him? According to this objection, al-Jāḥiẓ concluded that we must have prior knowledge of that for which we are responsible for reasoning, and consequently claimed that knowledge of God must be natural and necessary. The problem of whether knowledge of God comes naturally to man or through reasoning and reflection seems to have been the subject of long-lasting debates among theologians. The theologians of the Basra Muʿtazilites paid special attention to criticizing the approach of the ashāb al-maʿarif. In this context, Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār rejected al-Jāḥiẓs argument that peoples knowledge of God must be naturally occurring and argued that peoples knowledge of God is the result of their mental activity. Accordingly, knowledge of God is acquired through reasoning and thinking. Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār argues that if all knowledge, including knowledge of God, is considered naturally occurring and necessary, then individuals have no role in creating knowledge. Moreover, this idea not only renders reasoning as an act meaningless but also undermines the understanding of human agency. For we know that the actions of others and ourselves are caused by a dāʿīmotive and not by a counter-dāʿī sārif. Therefore, the fact that our actions are realized according to our intentionwill and dāʿīs, and not according to our counter-will kerāhāt and counter-dāʿī sāwārif shows that reasoning is also an act of ours. On the other hand, to argue that knowledge of God occurs naturally in the individual would mean that people are born with this knowledge. If people innately knew Gods existence, there should be no disagreement about Gods existence. However, people have different views on the existence of God, which shows that al-Jāḥiẓs claim is false. Furthermore, to say that knowledge of God occurs in a person without any role on his part would also make it impossible to explain his religious responsibility. Based on these reasons, Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār followed the traditional ideas of Muʿtazilite theology by trying to show that knowledge of God, like other moral actions, comes from peoples free will and is a result of thinking, meaning that this knowledge is based on reasoning rather than being something everyone has to know. This article will discuss the debate among the theologians of the Basra Muʿtazilites regarding the nature of knowledge of God. For this purpose, we will first examine the path leading to the opinion of the Ashāb al-maʿārif and discuss the idea of nature, will, and act. Then, we will present the arguments of the Ashāb al-maʿārif that knowledge of God is naturalnecessary and investigate how these arguments are criticized by Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār. Finally, we will examine his counterarguments against the Ashāb al-maʿārif and discuss how he shows that this kind of knowledge is the result of human mental activity. In the conclusion, we will end the article with a comparison of both approaches.

 The traditional approach of theologians in general and Muʿtazilite theologians in particular to the problem of the nature of knowledge of God is that such knowledge is attained through reasoning nazar. However, among the Muʿtazilites, the Ashāb al-maʿārif, led by theologians such as al-Sumāmah b. Ashras, ʿAlī al-Aswārī, and al-Jāḥiẓ, raised the problem of the inferential nature of knowledge of God and departed from the traditional Muʿtazilite approach by arguing that this kind of knowledge occurs naturally in human beings and is necessary. This approach of the Ashāb al-maʿārif was a consequence of their belief that all knowledge arises naturally from human beings. Ashāb al-maʿārif tried to justify his view of natural knowledge with arguments. Although al-Jāḥiẓs approach has a basis within the framework of his understanding of nature, it seems that the main justification for his approach is the idea that we cannot be held responsible for reasoning about God without having prior knowledge of Him. Al-Jāḥiẓ derived the following paradox from the statement The reasoning that leads to the knowledge of God is obligatory: How can we be held responsible for the reasoning that leads us to know God when we dont yet know Him? According to this objection, al-Jāḥiẓ concluded that we must have prior knowledge of that for which we are responsible for reasoning, and consequently claimed that knowledge of God must be natural and necessary. The problem of whether knowledge of God comes naturally to man or through reasoning and reflection seems to have been the subject of long-lasting debates among theologians. The theologians of the Basra Muʿtazilites paid special attention to criticizing the approach of the ashāb al-maʿarif. In this context, Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār rejected al-Jāḥiẓs argument that peoples knowledge of God must be naturally occurring and argued that peoples knowledge of God is the result of their mental activity. Accordingly, knowledge of God is acquired through reasoning and thinking. Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār argues that if all knowledge, including knowledge of God, is considered naturally occurring and necessary, then individuals have no role in creating knowledge. Moreover, this idea not only renders reasoning as an act meaningless but also undermines the understanding of human agency. For we know that the actions of others and ourselves are caused by a dāʿīmotive and not by a counter-dāʿī sārif. Therefore, the fact that our actions are realized according to our intentionwill and dāʿīs, and not according to our counter-will kerāhāt and counter-dāʿī sāwārif shows that reasoning is also an act of ours. On the other hand, to argue that knowledge of God occurs naturally in the individual would mean that people are born with this knowledge. If people innately knew Gods existence, there should be no disagreement about Gods existence. However, people have different views on the existence of God, which shows that al-Jāḥiẓs claim is false. Furthermore, to say that knowledge of God occurs in a person without any role on his part would also make it impossible to explain his religious responsibility. Based on these reasons, Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār followed the traditional ideas of Muʿtazilite theology by trying to show that knowledge of God, like other moral actions, comes from peoples free will and is a result of thinking, meaning that this knowledge is based on reasoning rather than being something everyone has to know. This article will discuss the debate among the theologians of the Basra Muʿtazilites regarding the nature of knowledge of God. For this purpose, we will first examine the path leading to the opinion of the Ashāb al-maʿārif and discuss the idea of nature, will, and act. Then, we will present the arguments of the Ashāb al-maʿārif that knowledge of God is naturalnecessary and investigate how these arguments are criticized by Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār. Finally, we will examine his counterarguments against the Ashāb al-maʿārif and discuss how he shows that this kind of knowledge is the result of human mental activity. In the conclusion, we will end the article with a comparison of both approaches.

 Tanrıya ilişkin bilginin doğası sorununa yönelik genelde kelâmcıların özelde Muʿtezile kelâmcılarının geleneksel yaklaşımı, bu türden bir bilgiye akıl yürütmeyle nazar veya istidlâl ulaşıldığı yönündedir. Ancak Muʿtezile içerisinde Sümâme b. Eşres, Ali el-Esvârî ve Câhiz gibi kelâmcıların başını çektiği ashâbül-maârif Tanrı bilgisinin çıkarımsal oluşunu bir sorun haline getirmiş, bu türden bir bilginin insanda doğal yolla meydana gelip zorunlu olduğunu ileri sürerek geleneksel Muʿtezilî yaklaşımdan ayrılmışlardır. Ashâbül-maârifin bu yaklaşımı bütün bilgilerin insandan doğal yolla meydana geldiği düşüncesinin bir sonucuydu. Ashâbül-maârif, doğal bilgi görüşünü birtakım argümanlarla temellendirmeye çalıştı. Câhizin yaklaşımının tabiat anlayışı çerçevesinde bir temeli olmakla birlikte, öyle görünüyor ki onu buna iten temel gerekçe, önceden Tanrıya dair bir bilgiye sahip olmadan, Onun hakkında akıl yürütmede bulunmakla sorumlu tutulamayacağımız düşüncesidir. Bu çerçevede Câhiz Tanrıyı bilmeye götüren nazar vâciptir önermesinden şöyle bir paradoks üretti: Kendisine akıl yürüterek ulaşacağımız şeyi henüz bilmiyorken, bizi onu bilmeye götürecek akıl yürütmeyle sorumlu olduğumuzu nasıl ileri sürebiliriz? Bu sorunun çözümü bağlamında Câhiz, hakkında akıl yürütmeyle nazar sorumlu olduğumuz şeyin bilgisine önceden sahip olmamız gerektiği sonucuna ulaşmış ve bunun neticesinde de Tanrıya ilişkin bilginin doğal ve zorunlu olması gerektiğini iddia etmiştir. Böylece Tanrı bilgisinin insanda doğal yolla mı yoksa akıl yürütmeyle mi meydana geldiği problemi, Muʿtezilî kelâmcılar arasında uzun süren tartışmalara konu olmuştur. Basra Muʿtezilesi kelâmcıları ashâbül-maârifin söz konusu yaklaşımını eleştirmeye özel bir önem verdiler. Kâdî Abdülcebbâr, Câhizin insanların Tanrı hakkında sahip oldukları bilgilerin doğal olarak meydana gelmesi gerektiğini savunan argümanını reddetmiş, insanların Tanrı hakkındaki bilgilerinin onların zihinsel faaliyetleri sonucunda elde edildiğini öne sürmüştür. Kâdî Abdülcebbâra göre bütün bilgilerin ve bunlar içerisinde de Tanrı bilgisinin doğal yolla meydana geldiğini ve zorunlu olduğunu ileri sürmek, kişinin bilgiyi üretmek için herhangi bir rolünün bulunmadığı anlamına gelmektedir. Dahası bu düşünce sadece bir fiil olarak akıl yürütmeyi anlamsız kılmamakta, aynı zamanda insanın fâilliği anlayışını da zedelemektedir. Zira biz gerek başkalarına gerek kendimize ait eylemlerin birer dâîgüdü ile meydana geldiğini, karşı-dâî ile de gerçekleşmediğini biliyoruz. Şu hâlde eylemlerimizin bizim kasdirade ve dâilerimize göre gerçekleşmesi, karşı-irade kerâhet ve karşı-dâîlerimize savârıf göre gerçekleşmemesi akıl yürütmenin bizim bir fiilimiz olduğunu göstermektedir. Öte yandan Tanrıya ilişkin bilginin kişide doğal olarak meydana geldiği düşüncesi, bütün insanların bu bilgiye sahip olması anlamına gelecektir. Bu durumda da insanlar arasında Tanrının varlığına dair hiçbir ihtilafın olmaması gerekirdi. Hâlbuki insanlar Tanrının varlığına dair farklı görüşlere sahiptir ve bu da Câhizin iddiasının yanlış olduğunu gösterir. Yine Tanrı bilgisinin kişide onun herhangi bir rolü olmadan meydana geldiğini söylemek, onun inançsal sorumluluğunu açıklamayı da imkânsız hale getirecektir. Kâdî Abdülcebbâr söz konusu gerekçelerden hareketle bu türden bir bilginin tıpkı insanın diğer ahlaki fillerinde olduğu gibi onun özgür iradesiyle meydana geldiğini, dolayısıyla akıl yürütme faaliyetinin sonucunda ortaya çıktığını, bu nedenle böyle bir bilginin zorunlu değil çıkarımsal olduğunu kanıtlamaya çalışarak Muʿtezile kelâmının geleneksel yaklaşımını sürdürdü. İşte bu makalede Basra Mutezilesi kelâmcıları arasında yaşanan Tanrı bilgisinin nasıl elde edileceğine yönelik söz konusu tartışma ele alınacaktır. Bu amaçla öncelikle ashâbül-maârifin görüşüne uzanan yolu inceleyerek tabiat, irade ve fiil düşüncesini ele alacağız. Ardından ashâbül-maârifin Tanrı bilgisinin doğalzorunlu olduğuna yönelik argümanlarına yer verecek, bu argümanların Kâdî Abdülcebbâr tarafından nasıl kritik edildiğini soruşturacağız. Son olarak onun ashâbül-maârife yönelttiği karşı-argümanları inceleyerek bu türden bir bilginin insanın zihinsel faaliyetleri sonucunda nasıl meydana geldiğini ele alacağız. Sonuç bölümünde ise her iki yaklaşıma yönelik bir değerlendirmeyle makaleyi tamamlayacağız.

Makale detayları

The Epistemological Status of Knowledge About God in Basran Muʿtazilism: Ashāb al-maʿārif’s Conception of Necessary Knowledge and Its Critique by Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār

Yazarlar:

Hayrettin Nebi Güdekli

Yayıncı:

Eskişehir Osmangazi University

Ana Başlıklar:

Kelam

Dergi:

Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi Vol.12 Issue 2, pp.699-722

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

9/2025

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001357940

pISSN:

2147-8171

Kalām

Muʿtazila

Ashāb al-Maʿārif

al-Jāḥiẓ

Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār

Nature

KnowledgeKelam

Muʿtezile

Ashâbü'l-Maârif

Câhız

Kâdî Abdülcebbâr

Tabiat

Bilgi

Sayı

Makale detayları

Yazarlar: Hayrettin Nebi Güdekli

Yayıncı: Eskişehir Osmangazi University

Ana Başlıklar: Kelam

Dergi: Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi Vol.12 Issue 2, pp.699-722

Belge Tipi: Makale

Yayın Tarihi: 9/2025

Belge Dili: Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.): 2001357940

pISSN: 2147-8171

Sayı

Yazarlar:

Hayrettin Nebi Güdekli

Yayıncı:

Eskişehir Osmangazi University

Ana Başlıklar:

Kelam

Dergi:

Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi Vol.12 Issue 2, pp.699-722

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

9/2025

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001357940

pISSN:

2147-8171