NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONTROL-UNREGISTERED EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER INCENTIVE AND PUNISHMENT STRATEGIES

Kerem Çolak

Makale detayları

NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONTROL-UNREGISTERED EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER INCENTIVE AND PUNISHMENT STRATEGIES

Yazarlar:

Kerem Çolak

Yayıncı:

Ege University

Ana Başlıklar:

Çalışma Ekonomisi | Oyun Teorisi

Dergi:

Ege Akademik Bakış Dergisi Vol.25 Issue 2, pp.305-320

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

8/2025

Belge Dili:

İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.):

2001340111

pISSN:

1303-099X

Anahtar kelimeler:

Özet:

 Unregistered employment, which has occupied the world economic agenda since the 1970s with the ILOs Kenya report, has become an important problem that needs to be solved as much as unemployment in countries. Policy makers and social planners try to intervene in the wage bargaining processes between workers and employers through a control mechanism and implement policies to prevent unregistered employment. For this reason, in addition to the routine inspections of companies by auditors, they implement penalties and incentives for registered employment. Thus, while the state achieves its goals of increasing tax and premium revenues, they also aim to increase the productivity of workers with the motivation of having a registered job. However, a conflict arises here between the social planners control function and the employers low-cost, high-profit behavior motivation. The article deals with this conflict issue and tries to determine the Nash Equilibrium of the parties by analyzing the employers registered or unregistered employment options against the social controllers punishment and incentive practices in a mixed strategy 2x2 game model. By analyzing the game model, the best response functions of the parties were obtained and the best response probabilities of the social planner and the employer against each other were determined through Nash Equilibrium. The effectiveness of penalties and incentives against unregistered employment was analyzed according to counter behaviors.

 Unregistered employment, which has occupied the world economic agenda since the 1970s with the ILOs Kenya report, has become an important problem that needs to be solved as much as unemployment in countries. Policy makers and social planners try to intervene in the wage bargaining processes between workers and employers through a control mechanism and implement policies to prevent unregistered employment. For this reason, in addition to the routine inspections of companies by auditors, they implement penalties and incentives for registered employment. Thus, while the state achieves its goals of increasing tax and premium revenues, they also aim to increase the productivity of workers with the motivation of having a registered job. However, a conflict arises here between the social planners control function and the employers low-cost, high-profit behavior motivation. The article deals with this conflict issue and tries to determine the Nash Equilibrium of the parties by analyzing the employers registered or unregistered employment options against the social controllers punishment and incentive practices in a mixed strategy 2x2 game model. By analyzing the game model, the best response functions of the parties were obtained and the best response probabilities of the social planner and the employer against each other were determined through Nash Equilibrium. The effectiveness of penalties and incentives against unregistered employment was analyzed according to counter behaviors.

 Unregistered employment, which has occupied the world economic agenda since the 1970s with the ILOs Kenya report, has become an important problem that needs to be solved as much as unemployment in countries. Policy makers and social planners try to intervene in the wage bargaining processes between workers and employers through a control mechanism and implement policies to prevent unregistered employment. For this reason, in addition to the routine inspections of companies by auditors, they implement penalties and incentives for registered employment. Thus, while the state achieves its goals of increasing tax and premium revenues, they also aim to increase the productivity of workers with the motivation of having a registered job. However, a conflict arises here between the social planners control function and the employers low-cost, high-profit behavior motivation. The article deals with this conflict issue and tries to determine the Nash Equilibrium of the parties by analyzing the employers registered or unregistered employment options against the social controllers punishment and incentive practices in a mixed strategy 2x2 game model. By analyzing the game model, the best response functions of the parties were obtained and the best response probabilities of the social planner and the employer against each other were determined through Nash Equilibrium. The effectiveness of penalties and incentives against unregistered employment was analyzed according to counter behaviors.

 Unregistered employment, which has occupied the world economic agenda since the 1970s with the ILOs Kenya report, has become an important problem that needs to be solved as much as unemployment in countries. Policy makers and social planners try to intervene in the wage bargaining processes between workers and employers through a control mechanism and implement policies to prevent unregistered employment. For this reason, in addition to the routine inspections of companies by auditors, they implement penalties and incentives for registered employment. Thus, while the state achieves its goals of increasing tax and premium revenues, they also aim to increase the productivity of workers with the motivation of having a registered job. However, a conflict arises here between the social planners control function and the employers low-cost, high-profit behavior motivation. The article deals with this conflict issue and tries to determine the Nash Equilibrium of the parties by analyzing the employers registered or unregistered employment options against the social controllers punishment and incentive practices in a mixed strategy 2x2 game model. By analyzing the game model, the best response functions of the parties were obtained and the best response probabilities of the social planner and the employer against each other were determined through Nash Equilibrium. The effectiveness of penalties and incentives against unregistered employment was analyzed according to counter behaviors.

Makale detayları

NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONTROL-UNREGISTERED EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER INCENTIVE AND PUNISHMENT STRATEGIES

Yazarlar:

Kerem Çolak

Yayıncı:

Ege University

Ana Başlıklar:

Çalışma Ekonomisi | Oyun Teorisi

Dergi:

Ege Akademik Bakış Dergisi Vol.25 Issue 2, pp.305-320

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

8/2025

Belge Dili:

İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.):

2001340111

pISSN:

1303-099X

Informal Employment

Informality

Social Planner

Social Audit

Game Theory

Nash Solution

Sayı

Makale detayları

NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONTROL-UNREGISTERED EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER INCENTIVE AND PUNISHMENT STRATEGIES

Yazarlar: Kerem Çolak

Yayıncı: Ege University

Ana Başlıklar: Çalışma Ekonomisi | Oyun Teorisi

Dergi: Ege Akademik Bakış Dergisi Vol.25 Issue 2, pp.305-320

Belge Tipi: Makale

Yayın Tarihi: 8/2025

Belge Dili: İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.): 2001340111

pISSN: 1303-099X

Informal Employment

Informality

Social Planner

Social Audit

Game Theory

Nash Solution

Sayı

Yazarlar:

Kerem Çolak

Yayıncı:

Ege University

Ana Başlıklar:

Çalışma Ekonomisi | Oyun Teorisi

Dergi:

Ege Akademik Bakış Dergisi Vol.25 Issue 2, pp.305-320

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

8/2025

Belge Dili:

İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.):

2001340111

pISSN:

1303-099X