Can Negative Atheism Justify Atheism?

Fatma Nur Ağca

Makale detayları

Can Negative Atheism Justify Atheism?

Yazarlar:

Fatma Nur Ağca

Yayıncı:

Ataturk University

Ana Başlıklar:

Din Felsefesi

Dergi:

İlahiyat Tetkikleri Dergisi Issue 61, pp.164-178

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

6/2024

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001312469

pISSN:

2458-7508

Anahtar kelimeler:

Özet:

 The question of whether atheism is a position that needs justification and under what conditions a rational justification can be mentioned is as important as the problem of justification of theism. This article examines what kind of justification is set forth when atheism is defined negatively, such as the nonbelief or the absence of belief in God. If atheism is considered as absence of belief, does this imply that it is exempt from justification? Do not atheists have the burden of provingthe proposition God exists is false, and the proposition There is no God is true? When it comes to atheistic justification, two different approaches emerge: the absence of evidence approach and the evidence of absence approach. The article discusses whether the denial of the proposition God exists is necessary when there is no sufficient evidence for its truth. Another problematic approach discussed in the article is the question of whether the absence of sufficient evidence can legitimize the transition from negative atheism to positive atheism. It is argued that atheism needs positive evidence for its justification rather than relying on the absence of evidence as evidence of absence. If atheism is considered as a psychological state of nonbelief rather than a propositional attitude, this would lead us to disregard its epistemic dimension. In this study, the possibility of viewing atheism as a state of nonbelief or indifference towards the existence of God is examined, and this study aims to demonstrate that this perspective cannot contribute to atheistic argumentation. From an evidentialist perspective, inferring that atheism is true without presenting evidence seems internally inconsistent.

 The question of whether atheism is a position that needs justification and under what conditions a rational justification can be mentioned is as important as the problem of justification of theism. This article examines what kind of justification is set forth when atheism is defined negatively, such as the nonbelief or the absence of belief in God. If atheism is considered as absence of belief, does this imply that it is exempt from justification? Do not atheists have the burden of provingthe proposition God exists is false, and the proposition There is no God is true? When it comes to atheistic justification, two different approaches emerge: the absence of evidence approach and the evidence of absence approach. The article discusses whether the denial of the proposition God exists is necessary when there is no sufficient evidence for its truth. Another problematic approach discussed in the article is the question of whether the absence of sufficient evidence can legitimize the transition from negative atheism to positive atheism. It is argued that atheism needs positive evidence for its justification rather than relying on the absence of evidence as evidence of absence. If atheism is considered as a psychological state of nonbelief rather than a propositional attitude, this would lead us to disregard its epistemic dimension. In this study, the possibility of viewing atheism as a state of nonbelief or indifference towards the existence of God is examined, and this study aims to demonstrate that this perspective cannot contribute to atheistic argumentation. From an evidentialist perspective, inferring that atheism is true without presenting evidence seems internally inconsistent.

 The question of whether atheism is a position that needs justification and under what conditions a rational justification can be mentioned is as important as the problem of justification of theism. This article examines what kind of justification is set forth when atheism is defined negatively, such as the nonbelief or the absence of belief in God. If atheism is considered as absence of belief, does this imply that it is exempt from justification? Do not atheists have the burden of provingthe proposition God exists is false, and the proposition There is no God is true? When it comes to atheistic justification, two different approaches emerge: the absence of evidence approach and the evidence of absence approach. The article discusses whether the denial of the proposition God exists is necessary when there is no sufficient evidence for its truth. Another problematic approach discussed in the article is the question of whether the absence of sufficient evidence can legitimize the transition from negative atheism to positive atheism. It is argued that atheism needs positive evidence for its justification rather than relying on the absence of evidence as evidence of absence. If atheism is considered as a psychological state of nonbelief rather than a propositional attitude, this would lead us to disregard its epistemic dimension. In this study, the possibility of viewing atheism as a state of nonbelief or indifference towards the existence of God is examined, and this study aims to demonstrate that this perspective cannot contribute to atheistic argumentation. From an evidentialist perspective, inferring that atheism is true without presenting evidence seems internally inconsistent.

 Ateizmin gerekçelendirilmesi gereken bir tutum olup olmadığı ve hangi koşulların sağlanması durumunda rasyonel bir gerekçelendirmeden bahsedilebileceği sorunu, en az teizmin gerekçelendirilmesi sorunu kadar önemlidir. Bu makalede ateizmin inançsızlık veya Tanrı inancının bulunmaması şeklinde negatif yolla tanımlanması durumunda nasıl bir gerekçelendirmenin öngörüldüğü ele alınmaktadır. Ateizm, inançsızlık olarak ele alınırsa, bu durum onun gerekçelendirmeden muaf olduğu sonucuna götürebilir mi? Ateistin Tanrı vardır önermesinin yanlış, Tanrı yoktur önermesinin doğru olduğunu gösterme amaçlı bir ispat yükümlülüğü bulunmamakta mıdır? Ateistik gerekçelendirme söz konusu olduğunda karşımıza delilin yokluğu yaklaşımı ve yokluğun delili yaklaşımı olmak üzere iki farklı seçenek çıkar. Bu makalenin konusu olan delilin yokluğu yaklaşımının değerlendirilebilmesi için öncelikle Tanrı vardır önermesinin doğruluğuna dair yeterli delil bulunmaması durumunda bu önermenin inkârının zorunlu olup olamayacağı ele alınmıştır. Daha sonra ise yeterli delil bulunmaması durumunun negatif ateizmden pozitif ateizme geçişi meşru kılıp kılamayacağı irdelenmiştir. Makalede ateizmin gerekçelendirilebilmesinin, delilin yokluğunun yokluğun delili için yeterli görüldüğü bir savunmadan ziyade pozitif deliller ile mümkün olabileceği savunulmaktadır. Ateizm, önermesel bir tutumdan ziyade bir tür psikolojik inançsızlık hâli olarak değerlendirilirse bu durum, onun epistemik boyutunun göz ardı edilmesine neden olacaktır. Bu çalışmada ateizmin Tanrının varlığına dair inançsızlık veya bir tür kayıtsızlık hâli olarak görülmesinin imkânı irdelenmekte ve bu durumun ateistik savunuya bir katkı sağlayamayacağının gösterilmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Delilci bir bakış açısından herhangi bir delil sunmadan ateizmin doğru olduğu sonucuna ulaşılması, kendi kendisine referansla tutarsız görünmektedir.

Makale detayları

Can Negative Atheism Justify Atheism?

Yazarlar:

Fatma Nur Ağca

Yayıncı:

Ataturk University

Ana Başlıklar:

Din Felsefesi

Dergi:

İlahiyat Tetkikleri Dergisi Issue 61, pp.164-178

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

6/2024

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001312469

pISSN:

2458-7508

Philosophy of Religion

Negative Atheism

Positive Atheism

Justification

EvidentialismDin Felsefesi

Negatif Ateizm

Pozitif Ateizm

Gerekçelendirme

Delilcilik

Sayı

Makale detayları

Yazarlar: Fatma Nur Ağca

Yayıncı: Ataturk University

Ana Başlıklar: Din Felsefesi

Dergi: İlahiyat Tetkikleri Dergisi Issue 61, pp.164-178

Belge Tipi: Makale

Yayın Tarihi: 6/2024

Belge Dili: Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.): 2001312469

pISSN: 2458-7508

Sayı

Yazarlar:

Fatma Nur Ağca

Yayıncı:

Ataturk University

Ana Başlıklar:

Din Felsefesi

Dergi:

İlahiyat Tetkikleri Dergisi Issue 61, pp.164-178

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

6/2024

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001312469

pISSN:

2458-7508