Fundamental and Non-Fundamental Beliefs In Terms of Epistemic Architecture

Mehmet Nuri Demir

Makale detayları

Fundamental and Non-Fundamental Beliefs In Terms of Epistemic Architecture

Yazarlar:

Mehmet Nuri Demir

Yayıncı:

Van Yuzuncu Yıl University

Ana Başlıklar:

Mantık | Sosyoloji (Diğer)

Dergi:

Van İlahiyat Dergisi Vol.12 Issue 20, pp.60-73

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

6/2024

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001319562

pISSN:

2667-615X

Anahtar kelimeler:

Özet:

 In fundamental beliefs, in other words, in the internalist theory of knowledge, our beliefs are guaranteed by solid mental foundations, unshakable premises, epistemic principles and some reasons that lead to truth. However, in the theory of non-fundamental beliefs, that is, externalism, the conditions that guarantee knowledge are generally sought outside the mind. Now, in the epistemological sense, obtainingin formation by chance or situations that will eliminate error in information are not the kind of evidence or some principles present in the mind that foundationalists put forward; Cognitive resources such as perception, memory, introspection should also be taken into account in the expression of non-core beliefs. Accordingly, according to a non-foundationalist understanding of knowledge, belief is generally justifiedif it is the result of a reliable mental process such as standard perceptual processes, remembering states in terms of stored data, and introspection, and if there is nothing that weakens this reliable mental process. While the knowledge obtained based on basic beliefs is expressed with justified and perhaps even guaranteed true beliefs, reliablecausal cognitive and external processes are also taken into account in the transformation of non-basic beliefs in to knowledge. The importance of this study emerges as it aims to investigate the plausibility of fundamental and non-fundamental beliefs from the context of knowledge construction by investigating the issue from two dimension sand trying to produce a synthesis. In addition, it aims to justify both types of beliefs and secure knowledge within the framework of internalist and externalist theories of knowledge. Fundamental and non-fundamental belief forms have been described and partially compared within the framework of internalist and externalist understandings of knowledge, and this study has been prepared from a research and analysis perspective. The scope and limitation level of this study is related to the role of our beliefs in the construction of knowledge. While basic beliefs are expressed based on basic epistemic principles and solid mental foundations, non-basic beliefs are explained based on both cognitive and external sources such as perception, memory, introspection, experience and reliability. Th eproblematics of this study are generally about how basic and non-basic beliefs are distinguished and expressed, and which elements are used to guarantee knowledge. The study first tried to define and compare basic and non-basic beliefs. Afterwards, he tried to find solutions to the problems of this research by considering the relationship of both forms of belief with knowledge.

 In fundamental beliefs, in other words, in the internalist theory of knowledge, our beliefs are guaranteed by solid mental foundations, unshakable premises, epistemic principles and some reasons that lead to truth. However, in the theory of non-fundamental beliefs, that is, externalism, the conditions that guarantee knowledge are generally sought outside the mind. Now, in the epistemological sense, obtainingin formation by chance or situations that will eliminate error in information are not the kind of evidence or some principles present in the mind that foundationalists put forward; Cognitive resources such as perception, memory, introspection should also be taken into account in the expression of non-core beliefs. Accordingly, according to a non-foundationalist understanding of knowledge, belief is generally justifiedif it is the result of a reliable mental process such as standard perceptual processes, remembering states in terms of stored data, and introspection, and if there is nothing that weakens this reliable mental process. While the knowledge obtained based on basic beliefs is expressed with justified and perhaps even guaranteed true beliefs, reliablecausal cognitive and external processes are also taken into account in the transformation of non-basic beliefs in to knowledge. The importance of this study emerges as it aims to investigate the plausibility of fundamental and non-fundamental beliefs from the context of knowledge construction by investigating the issue from two dimension sand trying to produce a synthesis. In addition, it aims to justify both types of beliefs and secure knowledge within the framework of internalist and externalist theories of knowledge. Fundamental and non-fundamental belief forms have been described and partially compared within the framework of internalist and externalist understandings of knowledge, and this study has been prepared from a research and analysis perspective. The scope and limitation level of this study is related to the role of our beliefs in the construction of knowledge. While basic beliefs are expressed based on basic epistemic principles and solid mental foundations, non-basic beliefs are explained based on both cognitive and external sources such as perception, memory, introspection, experience and reliability. Th eproblematics of this study are generally about how basic and non-basic beliefs are distinguished and expressed, and which elements are used to guarantee knowledge. The study first tried to define and compare basic and non-basic beliefs. Afterwards, he tried to find solutions to the problems of this research by considering the relationship of both forms of belief with knowledge.

 In fundamental beliefs, in other words, in the internalist theory of knowledge, our beliefs are guaranteed by solid mental foundations, unshakable premises, epistemic principles and some reasons that lead to truth. However, in the theory of non-fundamental beliefs, that is, externalism, the conditions that guarantee knowledge are generally sought outside the mind. Now, in the epistemological sense, obtainingin formation by chance or situations that will eliminate error in information are not the kind of evidence or some principles present in the mind that foundationalists put forward; Cognitive resources such as perception, memory, introspection should also be taken into account in the expression of non-core beliefs. Accordingly, according to a non-foundationalist understanding of knowledge, belief is generally justifiedif it is the result of a reliable mental process such as standard perceptual processes, remembering states in terms of stored data, and introspection, and if there is nothing that weakens this reliable mental process. While the knowledge obtained based on basic beliefs is expressed with justified and perhaps even guaranteed true beliefs, reliablecausal cognitive and external processes are also taken into account in the transformation of non-basic beliefs in to knowledge. The importance of this study emerges as it aims to investigate the plausibility of fundamental and non-fundamental beliefs from the context of knowledge construction by investigating the issue from two dimension sand trying to produce a synthesis. In addition, it aims to justify both types of beliefs and secure knowledge within the framework of internalist and externalist theories of knowledge. Fundamental and non-fundamental belief forms have been described and partially compared within the framework of internalist and externalist understandings of knowledge, and this study has been prepared from a research and analysis perspective. The scope and limitation level of this study is related to the role of our beliefs in the construction of knowledge. While basic beliefs are expressed based on basic epistemic principles and solid mental foundations, non-basic beliefs are explained based on both cognitive and external sources such as perception, memory, introspection, experience and reliability. Th eproblematics of this study are generally about how basic and non-basic beliefs are distinguished and expressed, and which elements are used to guarantee knowledge. The study first tried to define and compare basic and non-basic beliefs. Afterwards, he tried to find solutions to the problems of this research by considering the relationship of both forms of belief with knowledge.

 Temel inançlarda, bir başka tabirle içselci bilgi teorisinde, sağlam zihinsel dayanaklar, sarsılmaz öncüller, epistemik ilkeler ve doğruluğa götüren bir kısım nedenler ile inançlarımız teminat altına alınmıştır. Ancak temel olmayan inançlar, yani dışsalcılık teorisinde ise bilgiyi teminat altına alan koşullar genel olarak zihin dışında aranır. Artık epistemolojik anlamda şans eseri bilgi elde etme veya bilgide yanılmayı bertaraf edecek durumlar tek başına temelcilerin öne sürdüğü çeşitten kanıtlar ya da zihinde mevcut bulunan bazı ilkeler değildir; algı, bellek içebakış gibi bilişsel kaynaklar da temel olmayan inançların ifadesinde hesaba katılmalıdır. Bu doğrultuda sadece temelci olmayan bir bilgi anlayışına göre inanç, genel manada, standart algısal süreçler, depolanmış veriler açısından hatırlama durumları ve içebakış gibi güvenilir bir zihinsel sürecin neticesi ise ve bu güvenilir zihinsel süreci zayıf düşüren hiçbir şey yoksa gerekçelendirilmiştir. Temel inançlara dayanılarak elde edilmiş bilgi, gerekçelendirilmiş hatta belki teminat altına alınmış doğru inançlar ile ifade edilirken, temel olmayan inançların bilgiye dönüşümünde güvenilirnedensel bilişsel ve dışsal süreçler de hesaba katılmıştır. Bu çalışmanın önemi, konuyu iki boyuttan araştırarak ve bir sentez üretmeye çalışarak bilginin inşası bağlamından temel ve temel olmayan inançların makuliyetini araştırmayı amaçlamasıyla ortaya çıkmaktadır. Ayrıca içselci ve dışsalcı bilgi teorileri çerçevesinde her iki inanç çeşidinin de gerekçelendirilebilmesini ve bilginin teminat altına alınmasını amaç edinmiştir. Temel ve temel olmayan inanç biçimleri, içselci ve dışsalcı bilgi anlayışları çerçevesinde betimlenerek kısmi olarak karşılaştırılmış ve bu çalışma bir araştırma ve inceleme perspektifi çerçevesinden hazırlanmıştır. Bu çalışmanın kapsamı ve sınırlılık düzeyi inançlarımızın bilginin inşasındaki rolü ile ilişkilidir. Temel inançlar temel epistemik ilkelere, sağlam zihinsel dayanaklara dayalı olarak ifade edilirken, temel olmayan inançlar, algı, bellek, içebakış, deneyim ve güvenirlik gibi gerek bilişsel gerekse de dışsal kaynaklara dayanarak açıklanmıştır. Bu çalışmanın problematikleri, genel olarak temel ve temel olmayan inançların birbirinden nasıl ayırt edilerek ifade edildiği, bilgiyi garanti altına almak için hangi unsurların kullanıldığı üzerinedir. Çalışma öncelikle temel ve temel olmayan inançları tanımlayarak karşılaştırmaya çalışmıştır. Sonrasında ise her iki inanç biçiminin de bilgiyle ilişkisini ele alarak bu araştırmanın problemlerine çözüm bulmaya çalışmıştır.

Makale detayları

Fundamental and Non-Fundamental Beliefs In Terms of Epistemic Architecture

Yazarlar:

Mehmet Nuri Demir

Yayıncı:

Van Yuzuncu Yıl University

Ana Başlıklar:

Mantık | Sosyoloji (Diğer)

Dergi:

Van İlahiyat Dergisi Vol.12 Issue 20, pp.60-73

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

6/2024

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001319562

pISSN:

2667-615X

Philosophy of Religion

Fundamental Beliefs

Non-Fundamental Beliefs

Internalism

Externalism

Justification.Din Felsefesi

Temel İnançlar

Temel Olmayan İnançlar

İçselcilik

Dışsalcılık

Gerekçelendirme

Sayı

Makale detayları

Yazarlar: Mehmet Nuri Demir

Yayıncı: Van Yuzuncu Yıl University

Ana Başlıklar: Mantık | Sosyoloji (Diğer)

Dergi: Van İlahiyat Dergisi Vol.12 Issue 20, pp.60-73

Belge Tipi: Makale

Yayın Tarihi: 6/2024

Belge Dili: Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.): 2001319562

pISSN: 2667-615X

Sayı

Yazarlar:

Mehmet Nuri Demir

Yayıncı:

Van Yuzuncu Yıl University

Ana Başlıklar:

Mantık | Sosyoloji (Diğer)

Dergi:

Van İlahiyat Dergisi Vol.12 Issue 20, pp.60-73

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

6/2024

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001319562

pISSN:

2667-615X