Friendly Atheism in William L. Rowe: The Argument from Pointless Evil and the Objection of Skeptical Theism

Semra Tüfenkçi

Makale detayları

Friendly Atheism in William L. Rowe: The Argument from Pointless Evil and the Objection of Skeptical Theism

Yazarlar:

Semra Tüfenkçi

Yayıncı:

Artvin Çoruh University

Ana Başlıklar:

Sistematik Felsefe (Diğer)

Dergi:

Akademik-Us Issue 17, pp.1-21

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

5/2025

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001349588

pISSN:

2587-0750

Anahtar kelimeler:

Özet:

 This article focuses on William L. Rowes concept of friendly atheism. For this purpose, it first examines what Rowe means byfriendly atheism, and then discusses the argument he bases on the concept of pointless evil that grounds his understanding of atheism. According to Rowe, although the evils we witness do not constitute a conclusive argument against the existence of God, the lack of a purpose behind these evils makes the existence of God improbable. Starting from the fact that the problem of evil does not provide definitive evidence against the existence of God, Rowe argues that theists may have rational grounds for believing in God and that atheists should adopt a friendly attitude toward theists. While the concept of friendly atheism, based on this background, offers a positive contribution to the theist-atheist debate, it is also open to criticism. However, before addressing these criticisms, the article will examine skeptical theism, which challenges the pointless evil argument  the basis of Rowes atheism  from an epistemic perspective. The pointless evil argument suggests that the evils in the world serve no greater good. Skeptical theism, on the other hand, claims that due to the limitations of human cognitive capacity, we cannot know whether the evils in the world serve some greater good. In this article, which aims to discuss Rowes concept of friendly atheism and the philosophical foundations and arguments on which it is based, it is determined that the use of the concept of friendly atheism is problematic in two respects. If the atheist favours his or her arguments, the designation of friendly atheism does not offer a different and alternative viewpoint to traditional atheism. On the other hand, if it is meant that the arguments for theism and atheism are equally rational, then the claim that atheism is more rational collapses.

 This article focuses on William L. Rowes concept of friendly atheism. For this purpose, it first examines what Rowe means byfriendly atheism, and then discusses the argument he bases on the concept of pointless evil that grounds his understanding of atheism. According to Rowe, although the evils we witness do not constitute a conclusive argument against the existence of God, the lack of a purpose behind these evils makes the existence of God improbable. Starting from the fact that the problem of evil does not provide definitive evidence against the existence of God, Rowe argues that theists may have rational grounds for believing in God and that atheists should adopt a friendly attitude toward theists. While the concept of friendly atheism, based on this background, offers a positive contribution to the theist-atheist debate, it is also open to criticism. However, before addressing these criticisms, the article will examine skeptical theism, which challenges the pointless evil argument  the basis of Rowes atheism  from an epistemic perspective. The pointless evil argument suggests that the evils in the world serve no greater good. Skeptical theism, on the other hand, claims that due to the limitations of human cognitive capacity, we cannot know whether the evils in the world serve some greater good. In this article, which aims to discuss Rowes concept of friendly atheism and the philosophical foundations and arguments on which it is based, it is determined that the use of the concept of friendly atheism is problematic in two respects. If the atheist favours his or her arguments, the designation of friendly atheism does not offer a different and alternative viewpoint to traditional atheism. On the other hand, if it is meant that the arguments for theism and atheism are equally rational, then the claim that atheism is more rational collapses.

 This article focuses on William L. Rowes concept of friendly atheism. For this purpose, it first examines what Rowe means byfriendly atheism, and then discusses the argument he bases on the concept of pointless evil that grounds his understanding of atheism. According to Rowe, although the evils we witness do not constitute a conclusive argument against the existence of God, the lack of a purpose behind these evils makes the existence of God improbable. Starting from the fact that the problem of evil does not provide definitive evidence against the existence of God, Rowe argues that theists may have rational grounds for believing in God and that atheists should adopt a friendly attitude toward theists. While the concept of friendly atheism, based on this background, offers a positive contribution to the theist-atheist debate, it is also open to criticism. However, before addressing these criticisms, the article will examine skeptical theism, which challenges the pointless evil argument  the basis of Rowes atheism  from an epistemic perspective. The pointless evil argument suggests that the evils in the world serve no greater good. Skeptical theism, on the other hand, claims that due to the limitations of human cognitive capacity, we cannot know whether the evils in the world serve some greater good. In this article, which aims to discuss Rowes concept of friendly atheism and the philosophical foundations and arguments on which it is based, it is determined that the use of the concept of friendly atheism is problematic in two respects. If the atheist favours his or her arguments, the designation of friendly atheism does not offer a different and alternative viewpoint to traditional atheism. On the other hand, if it is meant that the arguments for theism and atheism are equally rational, then the claim that atheism is more rational collapses.

 Bu makale, William L. Roweun dostane ateizm kavramı üzerine odaklanmaktadır. Bu amaçla öncelikle Roweun dostane ateizm kavramı ile ne kastettiği, daha sonra ateizm anlayışını amaçsız kötülük kavramı üzerinde temellendirdiği argümanı ele alınmıştır. Rowea göre, şahit olunan kötülükler Tanrının varlığı aleyhine kesin bir argüman oluşturmamakla birlikte, bu kötülüklerin bir amacının olmaması Tanrının varlığını ihtimal dışı kılar. Rowe, kötülük probleminin Tanrının varlığı aleyhine kesin bir kanıt oluşturmamasından yola çıkarak teistlerin Tanrıya inanırken rasyonel gerekçeleri olabileceğini ve ateistlerin teistlere dostça yaklaşmaları gerektiğini öne sürer. Ana fikri bu şekilde özetlenebilecek dostane ateizm kavramı, teist-ateist tartışmalarına olumlu bir katkı sunmakla birlikte eleştiriye açıktır. Ancak bu eleştirilerden önce, Roweun ateizmini temellendirdiği amaçsız kötülük argümanını epistemik açıdan sorgulayan şüpheci teizm ele alınacaktır. Amaçsız kötülük argümanı dünyadaki kötülüklerin herhangi bir iyiye hizmet etmediğini öne sürer. Şüpheci teizm ise insanın bilişsel kapasitenin sınırlı olması nedeniyle dünyadaki kötülüklerin bir iyiye hizmet edip etmediğini bilemeyeceğimizi iddia eder. Roweun dostane ateizm kavramını ve bu kavramın dayandığı felsefî temelleri ve argümanları tartışmayı amaçlayan bu makalede dostane ateizm kavramını kullanmanın iki açıdan problemli olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Eğer ateist kendi delillerini üstün tutuyorsa dostane ateizm adlandırması, geleneksel ateizmden farklı ve alternatif bir bakış açısı sunmaz. Öte yandan, teizmin ve ateizmin delillerinin eşit ölçüde rasyonel olduğu kastediliyorsa, ateizmin daha rasyonel olduğu iddiası çökmüş olur.

Makale detayları

Friendly Atheism in William L. Rowe: The Argument from Pointless Evil and the Objection of Skeptical Theism

Yazarlar:

Semra Tüfenkçi

Yayıncı:

Artvin Çoruh University

Ana Başlıklar:

Sistematik Felsefe (Diğer)

Dergi:

Akademik-Us Issue 17, pp.1-21

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

5/2025

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001349588

pISSN:

2587-0750

Philosophy of Religion

William L. Rowe

Friendly Atheism

Pointless Evil

Skeptical TheismDin Felsefesi

William L. Rowe

Dostane Ateizm

Amaçsız Kötülükler

Şüpheci Teizm

Sayı

Makale detayları

Yazarlar: Semra Tüfenkçi

Yayıncı: Artvin Çoruh University

Ana Başlıklar: Sistematik Felsefe (Diğer)

Dergi: Akademik-Us Issue 17, pp.1-21

Belge Tipi: Makale

Yayın Tarihi: 5/2025

Belge Dili: Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.): 2001349588

pISSN: 2587-0750

Sayı

Yazarlar:

Semra Tüfenkçi

Yayıncı:

Artvin Çoruh University

Ana Başlıklar:

Sistematik Felsefe (Diğer)

Dergi:

Akademik-Us Issue 17, pp.1-21

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

5/2025

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001349588

pISSN:

2587-0750