REALİST VE REALİST KARŞITI GÖRÜŞLERDE  GÖZLENEBİLİRLİK KAVRAMI

Sedat YAZICI

Makale detayları

REALİST VE REALİST KARŞITI GÖRÜŞLERDE GÖZLENEBİLİRLİK KAVRAMI

Yazarlar:

Sedat YAZICI

Yayıncı:

Association for Turkish Philosophy

Dergi:

The Philosophy World 2004 Issue 39, pp.170-179

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

6/2004

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2000430618

pISSN:

1301-0875

Özet:

 

This paper critically examines the central tenet of constructive empiricism, namely  that the epistemological significance between observable and unobservabie entities plays  a putative role for our attitudes toward scientific theories. More specifically, I shall try  to show whether the distinction Van Fraassen draws between observable and unobservable entities is epistemicaliy significant or an arbitrary criterion. I suggest that even if  observation in the sense of perception were theory-neutral that does not make any difference in testing scientific theories, because the kind of testability that scientific theories must pass is based upon not personal or subjective beliefs but intersubjectively  shared ones.

Makale detayları

REALİST VE REALİST KARŞITI GÖRÜŞLERDE GÖZLENEBİLİRLİK KAVRAMI

Yazarlar: Sedat YAZICI

Yayıncı: Association for Turkish Philosophy

Dergi: The Philosophy World 2004 Issue 39, pp.170-179

Belge Tipi: Makale

Yayın Tarihi: 6/2004

Belge Dili: Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.): 2000430618

pISSN: 1301-0875

Sayı

Yazarlar:

Sedat YAZICI

Yayıncı:

Association for Turkish Philosophy

Dergi:

The Philosophy World 2004 Issue 39, pp.170-179

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

6/2004

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2000430618

pISSN:

1301-0875