EU Legal Landscape and EMCA on Mitigating Abuse by Majority Shareholder(s) in Public Companies: Any Inspiration for Minority Protection in Independent and Privately Held Turkish Anonim Ortaklık?

Onur Görmez

Makale detayları

EU Legal Landscape and EMCA on Mitigating Abuse by Majority Shareholder(s) in Public Companies: Any Inspiration for Minority Protection in Independent and Privately Held Turkish Anonim Ortaklık?

Yazarlar:

Onur Görmez

Yayıncı:

Istanbul University

Ana Başlıklar:

Environmental and Resources Law (Other)

Dergi:

İstanbul Hukuk Mecmuası Vol.82 Issue 2, pp.575-607

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

11/2024

Belge Dili:

İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.):

2001325604

pISSN:

2636-7734

Anahtar kelimeler:

Özet:

 In EU legislation, a general provision regulating abuse by the majority does not exist. Two approaches have been adopted in Member States. One requires both damage to the minority and to the company, named in this work as double-threshold approach, is implemented by eg France; the other deems the damage to the minority sufficient to conclude on the existence of abuse by the majority; this single-threshold approach is implemented by eg Germany and the Nordic countries. The latter approach, which is also set out by the European Model Companies Act EMCA, provides better protection to minority shareholders, especially those that are locked in an independent and private anonim ortaklık Turkish public company  briefly AO. Under EU legislation, as stated by the European Court of Justice in the Audiolux ruling, there does not exist an immanent principle of equal treatment of shareholders. Like EMCA, TCC art 357 imposes on company organs the duty of equal treatment of shareholders who are in the same position. With this provision, it can be argued that the singlethreshold approach is the prevalent approach in Turkish law to determine whether the majority has abused its powers. As for the effective remedies to protect the minority against abuse by majority in independent and privately held AO, a sell-out provision, a remedy implemented by the Directive EU 20171132 for cross-border conversions, mergers, and divisions of limited liability companies, should be introduced, and a modification to Article 531 of TCC on dissolution by just cause should be made, allowing minority shareholders to request directly from the court to exit the company via sale of their shares. EMCA provisions on Sections 11.35 and 11.37 regarding, respectively, the right to sell-out and redemption, and buyout may serve as an inspiration for TCC.

 In EU legislation, a general provision regulating abuse by the majority does not exist. Two approaches have been adopted in Member States. One requires both damage to the minority and to the company, named in this work as double-threshold approach, is implemented by eg France; the other deems the damage to the minority sufficient to conclude on the existence of abuse by the majority; this single-threshold approach is implemented by eg Germany and the Nordic countries. The latter approach, which is also set out by the European Model Companies Act EMCA, provides better protection to minority shareholders, especially those that are locked in an independent and private anonim ortaklık Turkish public company  briefly AO. Under EU legislation, as stated by the European Court of Justice in the Audiolux ruling, there does not exist an immanent principle of equal treatment of shareholders. Like EMCA, TCC art 357 imposes on company organs the duty of equal treatment of shareholders who are in the same position. With this provision, it can be argued that the singlethreshold approach is the prevalent approach in Turkish law to determine whether the majority has abused its powers. As for the effective remedies to protect the minority against abuse by majority in independent and privately held AO, a sell-out provision, a remedy implemented by the Directive EU 20171132 for cross-border conversions, mergers, and divisions of limited liability companies, should be introduced, and a modification to Article 531 of TCC on dissolution by just cause should be made, allowing minority shareholders to request directly from the court to exit the company via sale of their shares. EMCA provisions on Sections 11.35 and 11.37 regarding, respectively, the right to sell-out and redemption, and buyout may serve as an inspiration for TCC.

 In EU legislation, a general provision regulating abuse by the majority does not exist. Two approaches have been adopted in Member States. One requires both damage to the minority and to the company, named in this work as double-threshold approach, is implemented by eg France; the other deems the damage to the minority sufficient to conclude on the existence of abuse by the majority; this single-threshold approach is implemented by eg Germany and the Nordic countries. The latter approach, which is also set out by the European Model Companies Act EMCA, provides better protection to minority shareholders, especially those that are locked in an independent and private anonim ortaklık Turkish public company  briefly AO. Under EU legislation, as stated by the European Court of Justice in the Audiolux ruling, there does not exist an immanent principle of equal treatment of shareholders. Like EMCA, TCC art 357 imposes on company organs the duty of equal treatment of shareholders who are in the same position. With this provision, it can be argued that the singlethreshold approach is the prevalent approach in Turkish law to determine whether the majority has abused its powers. As for the effective remedies to protect the minority against abuse by majority in independent and privately held AO, a sell-out provision, a remedy implemented by the Directive EU 20171132 for cross-border conversions, mergers, and divisions of limited liability companies, should be introduced, and a modification to Article 531 of TCC on dissolution by just cause should be made, allowing minority shareholders to request directly from the court to exit the company via sale of their shares. EMCA provisions on Sections 11.35 and 11.37 regarding, respectively, the right to sell-out and redemption, and buyout may serve as an inspiration for TCC.

 AB mevzuatında, çoğunluğun kötüye kullanılması hususunu düzenleyen genel bir hüküm bulunmamaktadır. Üye devletlerde ise konuya dair iki ayrı yaklaşım bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan Fransada kabul gören çift eşikli yaklaşım olarak adlandırılabilecek ilki hem azınlığın hem de ortaklığın çıkarının zedelenmesini aramaktadır. Almanya ve İskandinav ülkeleri gibi bazı ülkelerde kabul gören tek aşamalı yaklaşım olarak adlandırılabilecek diğer yaklaşımda yalnızca azınlığın çıkarının zedelenmesi yeterli görülmektedir. AB düzenlemeleri de dikkate alınarak akademisyenler tarafından hazırlanan bir model yasa çalışması olan EMCAda da kendisine yer bulan ikinci yaklaşım azınlık pay sahipleri için daha iyi bir koruma sunmaktadır; özellikle izole ve halka kapalı anonim ortaklıkların azınlık pay sahipleri yönünden. Adalet Divanının Audiolux kararıyla da ortaya konduğu üzere AB Hukukunda pay sahipleri yönünden uygulama alanı bulacak genel geçer bir eşit işlem ilkesi söz konusu değildir. EMCAda olduğuna benzer şekilde TTK m.357de ise eşit şartlardaki pay sahiplerinin eşit işleme tabi tutulması gerekliliğini öngören hüküm uyarınca, Türk hukukunda da ortaklıkta çoğunluğun kötüye kullanılmasının tartışma konusu olduğu hallerde, kötüye kullanmayı tespit için tek eşikli yaklaşım yeterli olmalıdır. İzole ve halka açık olmayan anonim ortaklıklarda azınlık pay sahiplerinin etkin bir şekilde korunması için uygulanabilecek yöntemler bakımından ise, sınır aşan tür değiştirme, birleşme ve bölünmeler yönünden 20171132 sayılı Yönerge seviyesinde de öngörülen azınlığa ortaklıktan çıkma hakkı tanıyan bir düzenlemenin getirilmesi yerinde olacaktır. Haklı nedenle feshi düzenleyen TTK m.531in değiştirilmesi suretiyle azınlık pay sahiplerine, paylarını satarak ortaklıktan çıkmayı doğrudan mahkemeden talep edebilecekleri bir düzenleme getirilmesi de düşünülmelidir. EMCA Bölüm 11.35 ve Bölüm 11.37deki pay sahiplerinin paylarını satarak ortaklıktan çıkması ile payların satın alınmasını talep etme veya paylarını satmaya zorlama hususlarında öngörülen hükümlerden TTK için de esinlenilebilir.

Makale detayları

EU Legal Landscape and EMCA on Mitigating Abuse by Majority Shareholder(s) in Public Companies: Any Inspiration for Minority Protection in Independent and Privately Held Turkish Anonim Ortaklık?

Yazarlar:

Onur Görmez

Yayıncı:

Istanbul University

Ana Başlıklar:

Environmental and Resources Law (Other)

Dergi:

İstanbul Hukuk Mecmuası Vol.82 Issue 2, pp.575-607

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

11/2024

Belge Dili:

İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.):

2001325604

pISSN:

2636-7734

Public company

independent and privately held company

abuse by majority

EU legislation

European Model Companies Act (EMCA)

Turkish Commercial Code

CJEU’s Audiolux decisionİzole ve halka kapalı anonim ortaklık

çoğunluğun kötüye kullanılması

AB mevzuatı

Avrupa Model Ortaklıklar Yasası (EMCA)

Türk Ticaret Kanunu

Adalet Divanı’nın Audiolux kararı

Sayı

Makale detayları

Yazarlar: Onur Görmez

Yayıncı: Istanbul University

Ana Başlıklar: Environmental and Resources Law (Other)

Dergi: İstanbul Hukuk Mecmuası Vol.82 Issue 2, pp.575-607

Belge Tipi: Makale

Yayın Tarihi: 11/2024

Belge Dili: İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.): 2001325604

pISSN: 2636-7734

Sayı

Yazarlar:

Onur Görmez

Yayıncı:

Istanbul University

Ana Başlıklar:

Environmental and Resources Law (Other)

Dergi:

İstanbul Hukuk Mecmuası Vol.82 Issue 2, pp.575-607

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

11/2024

Belge Dili:

İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.):

2001325604

pISSN:

2636-7734