THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS

Mehtap Doğan

Makale detayları

THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS

Yazarlar:

Mehtap Doğan

Yayıncı:

Erciyes University

Ana Başlıklar:

Siyasal Teori ve Siyaset Felsefesi

Dergi:

Erciyes Akademi Vol.37 Issue 3, pp.1206-1218

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

9/2023

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001299733

pISSN:

2757-7031

Anahtar kelimeler:

Özet:

 One of the important problems of the philosophy of mind is other minds problem, which arises from the question How do we know whether a being other than ourselves has a mind?. This problem opens up for discussion a kind of skepticism towards other minds and the possibility that there is no mind with which the observable bodily and linguistic behaviors are causally related. If there is such a possibility, the proposed solutions to the argument concluding that we cannot be sure of the existence of a mind in any being other than ourselves are largely based on the analogy between ourselves and others. The approaches arguing that analogical inferences based on observable behaviors would be sufficient to show that there are minds in beings other than ourselves do not see the problem of other minds as an unsolvable problem. However, the skeptical attitude, by its very nature, continues to ask the same question and claims that limited analogical inferences are not sufficient to solve the problem of other minds. On the other hand, the best explanation argument suggests that the existence of other minds can be inferred inductively based on the thesis that it is more plausible to accept the existence of other minds than to deny it. However, none of the proposed solutions to the other minds problem is the result of a definite inference. These arguments put forward contingent conclusions reached through analogical or inductive reasoning and fail to provide a radical solution to the problem of other minds. However, when the argument formulating the other minds problem is analyzed with its premises and assumptions, it is seen that the validity of the argument is also open to debate. In this study, we argue that the other minds problem is not a real epistemological problem; it does not have a different content than the problem of phenomenal consciousness, which is an ontological problem.

 One of the important problems of the philosophy of mind is other minds problem, which arises from the question How do we know whether a being other than ourselves has a mind?. This problem opens up for discussion a kind of skepticism towards other minds and the possibility that there is no mind with which the observable bodily and linguistic behaviors are causally related. If there is such a possibility, the proposed solutions to the argument concluding that we cannot be sure of the existence of a mind in any being other than ourselves are largely based on the analogy between ourselves and others. The approaches arguing that analogical inferences based on observable behaviors would be sufficient to show that there are minds in beings other than ourselves do not see the problem of other minds as an unsolvable problem. However, the skeptical attitude, by its very nature, continues to ask the same question and claims that limited analogical inferences are not sufficient to solve the problem of other minds. On the other hand, the best explanation argument suggests that the existence of other minds can be inferred inductively based on the thesis that it is more plausible to accept the existence of other minds than to deny it. However, none of the proposed solutions to the other minds problem is the result of a definite inference. These arguments put forward contingent conclusions reached through analogical or inductive reasoning and fail to provide a radical solution to the problem of other minds. However, when the argument formulating the other minds problem is analyzed with its premises and assumptions, it is seen that the validity of the argument is also open to debate. In this study, we argue that the other minds problem is not a real epistemological problem; it does not have a different content than the problem of phenomenal consciousness, which is an ontological problem.

 One of the important problems of the philosophy of mind is other minds problem, which arises from the question How do we know whether a being other than ourselves has a mind?. This problem opens up for discussion a kind of skepticism towards other minds and the possibility that there is no mind with which the observable bodily and linguistic behaviors are causally related. If there is such a possibility, the proposed solutions to the argument concluding that we cannot be sure of the existence of a mind in any being other than ourselves are largely based on the analogy between ourselves and others. The approaches arguing that analogical inferences based on observable behaviors would be sufficient to show that there are minds in beings other than ourselves do not see the problem of other minds as an unsolvable problem. However, the skeptical attitude, by its very nature, continues to ask the same question and claims that limited analogical inferences are not sufficient to solve the problem of other minds. On the other hand, the best explanation argument suggests that the existence of other minds can be inferred inductively based on the thesis that it is more plausible to accept the existence of other minds than to deny it. However, none of the proposed solutions to the other minds problem is the result of a definite inference. These arguments put forward contingent conclusions reached through analogical or inductive reasoning and fail to provide a radical solution to the problem of other minds. However, when the argument formulating the other minds problem is analyzed with its premises and assumptions, it is seen that the validity of the argument is also open to debate. In this study, we argue that the other minds problem is not a real epistemological problem; it does not have a different content than the problem of phenomenal consciousness, which is an ontological problem.

 Zihin felsefesinin önemli problemlerinden bir tanesi Kendimizden başka bir varlığın bir zihne sahip olup olmadığını nasıl bileceğiz? sorusundan hareketle ortaya çıkan diğer zihinler problemidir. Bu problem, diğer zihinlere yönelik bir tür şüphecilik ile gözlemlenebilen bedensel ve dilsel davranışların nedensel ilişki kurduğu bir zihin olmama ihtimalini tartışmaya açmaktadır. Eğer böyle bir ihtimal varsa, kendimizden başka hiçbir varlıkta zihnin varlığından emin olamayız sonucuna ulaşan argümana sunulan çözülen önerileri büyük ölçüde kendimiz ile diğerleri arasındaki benzerlikten yola çıkmaktadır. Gözlemlenebilir davranışlardan hareketle yapılacak analojik çıkarımların kendimiz dışındaki varlıklarda da zihnin bulunduğunu göstermek için yeterli olacağını savunan yaklaşımlar, diğer zihinler problemini çözülemez bir problem olarak görmemektedir. Ancak şüpheci tavır doğası gereği, aynı soruyu sormaya devam etmekte ve sınırlı analojik çıkarımların diğer zihinler problemini çözmek için yeterli olmadığını iddia etmektedir. Diğer bir yandan, en iyi açıklama argümanı, diğer zihinlerin varlığını kabul etmenin reddetmekten daha makul olduğu tezine dayalı olarak tümevarımsal bir yöntemle diğer zihinlerin varlığına ulaşılabileceğini öne sürmektedir. Fakat diğer zihinler problemine yönelik çözüm önerilerinin hiçbirisi kesin bir çıkarımın sonucu değildir. Bu argümanlar, analojik ya da tümevarımsal akıl yürütmelerle ulaşılan olumsal sonuçlar öne sürmekte ve diğer zihinler problemine yönelik kökten bir çözüm üretememektedir. Bununla birlikte, diğer zihinler problemini oluşturan argümanın kendisi öncül ve varsayımlarıyla incelendiğinde, argümanın geçerliliğinin de tartışmaya açık olduğu görülmektedir. Bu çalışmada diğer zihinler probleminin, gerçek bir epistemolojik problem olmadığı; ontolojik bir problem olan fenomenal bilinç probleminden daha farklı bir içeriğe sahip olmadığı üzerine bir tartışma yürütülmektedir.

Makale detayları

THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS

Yazarlar:

Mehtap Doğan

Yayıncı:

Erciyes University

Ana Başlıklar:

Siyasal Teori ve Siyaset Felsefesi

Dergi:

Erciyes Akademi Vol.37 Issue 3, pp.1206-1218

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

9/2023

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001299733

pISSN:

2757-7031

Other minds problem

Phenomenal consciousness

The hard problem

The analogical argument

The best explanation argument.Diğer zihinler problemi

Fenomenal bilinç

Zor problem

Analoji argümanı

En iyi açıklama argümanı

Sayı

Makale detayları

Yazarlar: Mehtap Doğan

Yayıncı: Erciyes University

Ana Başlıklar: Siyasal Teori ve Siyaset Felsefesi

Dergi: Erciyes Akademi Vol.37 Issue 3, pp.1206-1218

Belge Tipi: Makale

Yayın Tarihi: 9/2023

Belge Dili: Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.): 2001299733

pISSN: 2757-7031

Sayı

Yazarlar:

Mehtap Doğan

Yayıncı:

Erciyes University

Ana Başlıklar:

Siyasal Teori ve Siyaset Felsefesi

Dergi:

Erciyes Akademi Vol.37 Issue 3, pp.1206-1218

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

9/2023

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001299733

pISSN:

2757-7031