Matrūkiyya (Desuetudo) as a Reason for Invalidity of Legal Norms in al-Māturīdī

Talip Türcan

Makale detayları

Matrūkiyya (Desuetudo) as a Reason for Invalidity of Legal Norms in al-Māturīdī

Yazarlar:

Talip Türcan

Yayıncı:

Hitit University

Ana Başlıklar:

İslam Hukuku

Dergi:

Hitit İlahiyat Dergisi Vol.23 Issue 1, pp.111-134

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

6/2024

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001322097

pISSN:

2757-6949

Anahtar kelimeler:

Özet:

 In the history of legal thought, various tendencies have emerged in defining the concept of legal validity, according to the adopted criteria. Legal validity has been subjected to axiological, material and formal evaluations as alternatives to each other. Legal validity is reduced to justice fairnessjustness when evaluated axiologically, to effectiveness efficacy when evaluated materially, and to belonging to a certain legal order when evaluated formally. The criteria of justice, effectiveness or belongingness, when taken as alternatives to each other, are not sufficient to define legality juridicité, that is, to distinguish law from other normative structures, and they also lead to an overlap between the concepts of legality and legal validity. What is just in the natural law doctrine and what is effective in the realist legal doctrine is considered both legal and valid. Positivist legal doctrine, on the other hand, defines legal validity as belonging to a certain legal order, which, in reality, cannot distinguish it from legality. Therefore, legal validity is tried to be comprehended as an additional quality to legality, based on the conditions regarding invalidity. In Islamic jurisprudence, legal validity is accepted as a formal evaluation, not axiological or material. This is a natural and necessary consequence of the principle of shariyya, on which the general theory of law is based. Any norm that does not have sharī character is not considered valid merely on the grounds that it is just or effective. Determining shariyya is a matter of authority and procedure. Tūfīs approach to validity based on maslaha and Ibn Qayyim Jawziyyas approach to validity based on justice, constitute exceptions to the established principle in Islamic jurisprudence. We find a similar exception in the Hanafī approach, which considers the effectiveness of the entire legal order as a condition for the validity of every single norm to be continued. This approach seems to be comparable to the positivist theory, which relates the effectiveness of the legal order as a whole to the validity of norms. In the classical doctrine of Islamic law, an opinion constructed at the theoretical level that a legal norm would lose its validity due to matrūkiyya desuetudo was, to the best of our knowledge, defended only by Abū Mansūr Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Samarqandī al-Māturīdī. al-Māturīdī explains his opinion of metrūkiyya as a reason for the invalidity of legal norms on the occasion of the interpretation of the 10th verse of the Sura al-Mumtahina and by taking as evidence the regulations prescribed in the verse, which were annuled by way of desuetudo in time. Desuetudo means that a norm loses its effectiveness. Indeed, al-Māturīdī also defines matrūkiyya as peoples abandonment of the norm. In al-Māturīdīs theory, although matrūkiyya is a reason for invalidity in terms of legal norms, it is not absolute. The abandonment of the norm, which occurs only under certain conditions, is prescribed as a reason for invalidity, not its mere abandonment. Accordingly, in order for a norm to be considered invalid due to matrūkiyya, the following conditions must occur together for the same norm: a. the absence of a statement in the Kitāb or the Sunnah indicating that the norm is invalidated, b. the rationale raison dêtre of the norm the purpose pursued when the norm was legislated is comprehensiblereasonable makūl, c. there is an agreement ijmā of people to abandon applying the norm or complying with the norm, d. the fact that the norm is about an event with a limited context of social relations hukm urf: being a special regulation regarding a certain social practice, e. the rationale of the norm has subsequently disappeared. In our opinion, al-Māturīdīs use of the term naskh for the concept of invalidity due to matrūkiyya implies that the relevant norm will not be valid again. For, he considers invalidity due to matrūkiyya to be possible only for norms that regulate events with a limited context of social relations, which confirms the conclusion we have drawn when taken in the sense of norms that are about events that will no longer take place in social life after their disappearance. In al-Māturīdīs theory, naskh due to matrūkiyya represents, in our opinion, a different form of realization of invalidity that cannot be reduced to naskh by ijtihād. Naskh by ijtihād means deciding on the invalidity of a norm through a process open to preference due to the disappearance of the rationale for its legislation over time. Although the norm is still applicable to the social relationship it is about, it is considered invalid because it no longer fulfills the rationale, for which it was legislated. However, naskh due to matrūkiyya is a purely factual type of invalidity. Not only the rationale for which the norm was legislated, but also the context of the social relationship has disappeared.

 Hukuk düşünce tarihinde hukukî geçerlilik kavramının tanımlanmasında, benimsenen ölçütlere bağlı olarak, çeşitli eğilimler açığa çıkmıştır. Hukukî geçerlilik, birbirinin alternatifi olmak üzere, aksiyolojik, maddî ve biçimsel nitelikli değerlendirmelere konu edilmiştir. Hukukî geçerlilik, aksiyolojik değerlendirme yapıldığında âdilliğe, maddî değerlendirme yapıldığında etkililiğe ve biçimsel değerlendirme yapıldığında da belli bir hukuk düzenine aidiyete indirgenmektedir. Âdillik, etkililik ya da aidiyet ölçütleri, birbirinin alternatifi olarak alındıklarında, hukukîliği tanımlamaya, yani hukuku başka normatif yapılardan ayırt etmeye yetmediği gibi, hukukîlik ve hukukî geçerlilik kavramları arasında da bir örtüşmeye yol açmaktadır. Doğal hukuk eğiliminde âdil olan ve realist hukuk eğiliminde de etkili olan hem hukukî hem de geçerli sayılmaktadır. Pozitivist hukuk eğilimi ise hukukî geçerliliği belli bir hukuk düzenine aidiyet biçiminde tanımlamaktadır ki, gerçekte bu tanım da onu hukukîlikten ayırt edememektedir. Bu itibarla hukukî geçerlilik, pozitivist eğilimde, geçersizliğe ilişkin koşullardan hareketle, hukukîliğe ilave bir nitelik olarak kavranmaya çalışılmaktadır. İslâm hukuk biliminde hukukî geçerlilik, aksiyolojik ya da maddî değil, biçimsel nitelikli bir değerlendirme olarak kabul edilmiştir. Bu, hukukun genel teorisinin üzerine kurulduğu şerîlik ilkesinin doğal ve zorunlu bir sonucudur. Şerî nitelik taşımayan herhangi bir norm, sırf âdil ya da etkili olduğu gerekçesiyle geçerli sayılmamaktadır. Şerîliğin tespiti ise bir yetki ve usûl procedure meselesidir. et-Tûfînin maslahatı ve İbn Kayyim el-Cevziyyenin de adaleti ölçüt alan geçerlilik yaklaşımları İslâm hukuk bilimindeki genel yaklaşıma istisna teşkil etmektedir. Benzer bir istisnayı, hukuk düzeninin bir bütün olarak etkililiğini, tek tek normların geçerliliklerini devam ettirebilmeleri bakımından koşul sayan hanefî görüşte buluyoruz. Bu görüş, hukuk düzeninin bir bütün olarak etkililiği ve normların geçerliliği arasında ilgi kuran pozitivist teori ile karşılaştırılabilir görünmektedir. İslâm hukuk biliminin klasik doktrininde bir hukuk normunun metrûkiyet sebebiyle geçerliliğini yitireceğine dair teori düzeyinde kurgulanmış bir görüş, bildiğimiz kadarıyla, yalnızca Ebû Mansûr Muhammed b. Muhammed es-Semerkandî el-Mâturîdî tarafından savunulmuştur. el-Mâturîdî, hukuk normlarının geçersizlik sebebi olarak metrûkiyet görüşünü Mümtehine Sûresinin 10. âyetinin tevîli münasebetiyle ve âyette öngörülen düzenlemelerin terke maruz kalmalarını delil alarak açıklamaktadır. Metrûkiyet, bir normun etkililiğini yitirmesi demektir. Nitekim el-Mâturîdî de metrûkiyeti, insanların normu uygulamayı terk etmeleri biçiminde tanımlamaktadır. el-Mâturîdînin teorisinde metrûkiyet, hukuk normları bakımından bir geçersizlik sebebi olmakla birlikte mutlak değildir. Normun salt terke maruz kalması değil, ancak belli koşullar içinde gerçekleşen metrûkiyet bir geçersizlik sebebi olarak öngörülmüştür. Buna göre bir normun metrûkiyet sebebiyle geçersiz sayılabilmesi için, a. normun geçersiz kılındığını gösteren Kitâb ya da Sünnette bir beyânın bulunmaması, b. normun konulma gerekçesinin norm sevk edilirken gözetilen amaç aklen kavranabilir hükmün makûl olması, c. normu uygulamayı ya da norma uymayı terk etme hususunda insanların ittifakının icmâ bulunması, d. normun, toplumsal ilişki bağlamı sınırlı bir olayı konu edinmesi hukm urf: belli bir toplumsal uygulamaya ilişkin özel düzenleme niteliğinde olması, e. konulma gerekçesinin sonradan ortadan kalkmış olması biçimindeki koşullar aynı norm özelinde birlikte gerçekleşmelidir. Metrûkiyet sebebiyle geçersizlik kavramını nesh terimiyle karşılaması, el-Mâturîdînin ilgili normun bir daha geçerlilik kazanamayacağı görüşünde olduğunu ima etmektedir. Zira o, metrûkiyet sebebiyle geçersizliği, yalnızca toplumsal ilişki bağlamı sınırlı olayları düzenleyen normlar hakkında mümkün görmektedir ki, bu, ortadan kalktıktan sonra bir daha toplumsal yaşamda yer almayacak olayları konu edinen normlar anlamında alındığında, çıkarsadığımız sonuç doğrulanmaktadır. el-Mâturîdînin teorisinde metrûkiyet sebebiyle nesh, kanımızca, geçersizliğin, ictihâdla neshe indirgenmesi mümkün olmayan, farklı bir gerçekleşme biçimini temsil etmektedir. İctihâdla nesh, normun, sevk edilme gerekçesinin zaman içinde ortadan kalkmasından ötürü, iradî bir işlemle geçersizliğine karar vermektir. Norm, konu edindiği toplumsal ilişkiye hâlâ uygulanabilir olmasına rağmen, sevk edilme gerekçesini artık gerçekleştirmiyor diye geçersiz sayılmaktadır. Hâlbuki metrûkiyet sebebiyle nesh tamamen olgusal bir geçersizlik türüdür. Normun, yalnızca sevk edilme gerekçesi değil, toplumsal ilişki bağlamı da ortadan kalkmış hâldedir.

 In the history of legal thought, various tendencies have emerged in defining the concept of legal validity, according to the adopted criteria. Legal validity has been subjected to axiological, material and formal evaluations as alternatives to each other. Legal validity is reduced to justice fairnessjustness when evaluated axiologically, to effectiveness efficacy when evaluated materially, and to belonging to a certain legal order when evaluated formally. The criteria of justice, effectiveness or belongingness, when taken as alternatives to each other, are not sufficient to define legality juridicité, that is, to distinguish law from other normative structures, and they also lead to an overlap between the concepts of legality and legal validity. What is just in the natural law doctrine and what is effective in the realist legal doctrine is considered both legal and valid. Positivist legal doctrine, on the other hand, defines legal validity as belonging to a certain legal order, which, in reality, cannot distinguish it from legality. Therefore, legal validity is tried to be comprehended as an additional quality to legality, based on the conditions regarding invalidity. In Islamic jurisprudence, legal validity is accepted as a formal evaluation, not axiological or material. This is a natural and necessary consequence of the principle of shariyya, on which the general theory of law is based. Any norm that does not have sharī character is not considered valid merely on the grounds that it is just or effective. Determining shariyya is a matter of authority and procedure. Tūfīs approach to validity based on maslaha and Ibn Qayyim Jawziyyas approach to validity based on justice, constitute exceptions to the established principle in Islamic jurisprudence. We find a similar exception in the Hanafī approach, which considers the effectiveness of the entire legal order as a condition for the validity of every single norm to be continued. This approach seems to be comparable to the positivist theory, which relates the effectiveness of the legal order as a whole to the validity of norms. In the classical doctrine of Islamic law, an opinion constructed at the theoretical level that a legal norm would lose its validity due to matrūkiyya desuetudo was, to the best of our knowledge, defended only by Abū Mansūr Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Samarqandī al-Māturīdī. al-Māturīdī explains his opinion of metrūkiyya as a reason for the invalidity of legal norms on the occasion of the interpretation of the 10th verse of the Sura al-Mumtahina and by taking as evidence the regulations prescribed in the verse, which were annuled by way of desuetudo in time. Desuetudo means that a norm loses its effectiveness. Indeed, al-Māturīdī also defines matrūkiyya as peoples abandonment of the norm. In al-Māturīdīs theory, although matrūkiyya is a reason for invalidity in terms of legal norms, it is not absolute. The abandonment of the norm, which occurs only under certain conditions, is prescribed as a reason for invalidity, not its mere abandonment. Accordingly, in order for a norm to be considered invalid due to matrūkiyya, the following conditions must occur together for the same norm: a. the absence of a statement in the Kitāb or the Sunnah indicating that the norm is invalidated, b. the rationale raison dêtre of the norm the purpose pursued when the norm was legislated is comprehensiblereasonable makūl, c. there is an agreement ijmā of people to abandon applying the norm or complying with the norm, d. the fact that the norm is about an event with a limited context of social relations hukm urf: being a special regulation regarding a certain social practice, e. the rationale of the norm has subsequently disappeared. In our opinion, al-Māturīdīs use of the term naskh for the concept of invalidity due to matrūkiyya implies that the relevant norm will not be valid again. For, he considers invalidity due to matrūkiyya to be possible only for norms that regulate events with a limited context of social relations, which confirms the conclusion we have drawn when taken in the sense of norms that are about events that will no longer take place in social life after their disappearance. In al-Māturīdīs theory, naskh due to matrūkiyya represents, in our opinion, a different form of realization of invalidity that cannot be reduced to naskh by ijtihād. Naskh by ijtihād means deciding on the invalidity of a norm through a process open to preference due to the disappearance of the rationale for its legislation over time. Although the norm is still applicable to the social relationship it is about, it is considered invalid because it no longer fulfills the rationale, for which it was legislated. However, naskh due to matrūkiyya is a purely factual type of invalidity. Not only the rationale for which the norm was legislated, but also the context of the social relationship has disappeared.

 In the history of legal thought, various tendencies have emerged in defining the concept of legal validity, according to the adopted criteria. Legal validity has been subjected to axiological, material and formal evaluations as alternatives to each other. Legal validity is reduced to justice fairnessjustness when evaluated axiologically, to effectiveness efficacy when evaluated materially, and to belonging to a certain legal order when evaluated formally. The criteria of justice, effectiveness or belongingness, when taken as alternatives to each other, are not sufficient to define legality juridicité, that is, to distinguish law from other normative structures, and they also lead to an overlap between the concepts of legality and legal validity. What is just in the natural law doctrine and what is effective in the realist legal doctrine is considered both legal and valid. Positivist legal doctrine, on the other hand, defines legal validity as belonging to a certain legal order, which, in reality, cannot distinguish it from legality. Therefore, legal validity is tried to be comprehended as an additional quality to legality, based on the conditions regarding invalidity. In Islamic jurisprudence, legal validity is accepted as a formal evaluation, not axiological or material. This is a natural and necessary consequence of the principle of shariyya, on which the general theory of law is based. Any norm that does not have sharī character is not considered valid merely on the grounds that it is just or effective. Determining shariyya is a matter of authority and procedure. Tūfīs approach to validity based on maslaha and Ibn Qayyim Jawziyyas approach to validity based on justice, constitute exceptions to the established principle in Islamic jurisprudence. We find a similar exception in the Hanafī approach, which considers the effectiveness of the entire legal order as a condition for the validity of every single norm to be continued. This approach seems to be comparable to the positivist theory, which relates the effectiveness of the legal order as a whole to the validity of norms. In the classical doctrine of Islamic law, an opinion constructed at the theoretical level that a legal norm would lose its validity due to matrūkiyya desuetudo was, to the best of our knowledge, defended only by Abū Mansūr Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Samarqandī al-Māturīdī. al-Māturīdī explains his opinion of metrūkiyya as a reason for the invalidity of legal norms on the occasion of the interpretation of the 10th verse of the Sura al-Mumtahina and by taking as evidence the regulations prescribed in the verse, which were annuled by way of desuetudo in time. Desuetudo means that a norm loses its effectiveness. Indeed, al-Māturīdī also defines matrūkiyya as peoples abandonment of the norm. In al-Māturīdīs theory, although matrūkiyya is a reason for invalidity in terms of legal norms, it is not absolute. The abandonment of the norm, which occurs only under certain conditions, is prescribed as a reason for invalidity, not its mere abandonment. Accordingly, in order for a norm to be considered invalid due to matrūkiyya, the following conditions must occur together for the same norm: a. the absence of a statement in the Kitāb or the Sunnah indicating that the norm is invalidated, b. the rationale raison dêtre of the norm the purpose pursued when the norm was legislated is comprehensiblereasonable makūl, c. there is an agreement ijmā of people to abandon applying the norm or complying with the norm, d. the fact that the norm is about an event with a limited context of social relations hukm urf: being a special regulation regarding a certain social practice, e. the rationale of the norm has subsequently disappeared. In our opinion, al-Māturīdīs use of the term naskh for the concept of invalidity due to matrūkiyya implies that the relevant norm will not be valid again. For, he considers invalidity due to matrūkiyya to be possible only for norms that regulate events with a limited context of social relations, which confirms the conclusion we have drawn when taken in the sense of norms that are about events that will no longer take place in social life after their disappearance. In al-Māturīdīs theory, naskh due to matrūkiyya represents, in our opinion, a different form of realization of invalidity that cannot be reduced to naskh by ijtihād. Naskh by ijtihād means deciding on the invalidity of a norm through a process open to preference due to the disappearance of the rationale for its legislation over time. Although the norm is still applicable to the social relationship it is about, it is considered invalid because it no longer fulfills the rationale, for which it was legislated. However, naskh due to matrūkiyya is a purely factual type of invalidity. Not only the rationale for which the norm was legislated, but also the context of the social relationship has disappeared.

Makale detayları

Matrūkiyya (Desuetudo) as a Reason for Invalidity of Legal Norms in al-Māturīdī

Yazarlar:

Talip Türcan

Yayıncı:

Hitit University

Ana Başlıklar:

İslam Hukuku

Dergi:

Hitit İlahiyat Dergisi Vol.23 Issue 1, pp.111-134

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

6/2024

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001322097

pISSN:

2757-6949

Islamic Law

Legality

Legal Norm

Legal Validity

Legal Invalidity

Naskh

Matrūkiyya (Desuetudo)

al-Māturīdī.İslam Hukuku

Hukukîlik

Hukuk Normu

Hukukî Geçerlilik

Hukukî Geçersizlik

Nesh

Metrûkiyet

el-Mâturîdî.

Sayı

Makale detayları

Yazarlar: Talip Türcan

Yayıncı: Hitit University

Ana Başlıklar: İslam Hukuku

Dergi: Hitit İlahiyat Dergisi Vol.23 Issue 1, pp.111-134

Belge Tipi: Makale

Yayın Tarihi: 6/2024

Belge Dili: Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.): 2001322097

pISSN: 2757-6949

Sayı

Yazarlar:

Talip Türcan

Yayıncı:

Hitit University

Ana Başlıklar:

İslam Hukuku

Dergi:

Hitit İlahiyat Dergisi Vol.23 Issue 1, pp.111-134

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

6/2024

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001322097

pISSN:

2757-6949