Rawls’ ‘Justice as Fairness’: Not only Political but also Metaphysical

Ferhat Taşkın

Makale detayları

Rawls’ ‘Justice as Fairness’: Not only Political but also Metaphysical

Yazarlar:

Ferhat Taşkın

Yayıncı:

Hitit University

Ana Başlıklar:

Din Felsefesi

Dergi:

Hitit İlahiyat Dergisi , pp.953-965

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

12/2023

Belge Dili:

İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.):

2001308590

pISSN:

2757-6949

Anahtar kelimeler:

Özet:

 In his book A Theory of Justice, John Rawls develops an account of justice, justice as fairness JAF, henceforth. In his later works, he claims that JAF is supposed to depend on neither philosophical nor religious claims but on political claims. So, the conception of justice he wishes to defend is political but not metaphysical. This political as well as moral in a specific sense conception of justice is supposed to apply to political, social, and economic institutions. By presenting JAF, Rawls aims to show how free and rational persons would hold the same conception of justice he defends if they have been invited to construct a just social contract. This would be the case, Rawls reasons, only if those persons determine the principles of justice as if they are in a purely hypothetical situation. Rawls calls this situation the original position and thinks that in the original position, parties and decision makers can be fair and impartial to construct a social contract if they can stand behind The Veil of Ignorance which is the main feature of the original position. The parties free and rational persons who stand behind the veil of ignorance know nothing about their place, class position, social status, intelligence, abilities, and the like in society. They do not know their conceptions of the good either. Since the parties are rational and capable of having a sense of justice, the fundamental agreement they could make behind the veil of ignorance with respect to the principles of justice will be fair. Rawls also develops an account of law the Law of Peoples to show that the principles of justice will be universal in its reach. He claims that both reasonably just liberal and decent hierarchical peoples like the Muslim peoples of the utopian state, Kazanistan would accept the principles of justice. Rawls argues, however, that since a decent hierarchical society does not consider its members as free and equal citizens as a liberal society does, it cannot be as reasonable and just as a liberal society. So, liberal peoples must encourage decent peoples to recognize the advantages of having liberal institutions and try to convince them to become more liberal in order to have a reasonably just society. In this paper, I will argue that Rawlss accounts of the original position and the Law of Peoples show that unlike what Rawls contends, JAF is not only political but also metaphysical. I will suggest that since Rawlss accounts of JAF and person require some metaphysical assumptions, theists who necessarily hold comprehensive metaphysical claims on justice and person have a good reason to reject that they should step behind the veil of ignorance in order to construct a just social contract.

 In his book A Theory of Justice, John Rawls develops an account of justice, justice as fairness JAF, henceforth. In his later works, he claims that JAF is supposed to depend on neither philosophical nor religious claims but on political claims. So, the conception of justice he wishes to defend is political but not metaphysical. This political as well as moral in a specific sense conception of justice is supposed to apply to political, social, and economic institutions. By presenting JAF, Rawls aims to show how free and rational persons would hold the same conception of justice he defends if they have been invited to construct a just social contract. This would be the case, Rawls reasons, only if those persons determine the principles of justice as if they are in a purely hypothetical situation. Rawls calls this situation the original position and thinks that in the original position, parties and decision makers can be fair and impartial to construct a social contract if they can stand behind The Veil of Ignorance which is the main feature of the original position. The parties free and rational persons who stand behind the veil of ignorance know nothing about their place, class position, social status, intelligence, abilities, and the like in society. They do not know their conceptions of the good either. Since the parties are rational and capable of having a sense of justice, the fundamental agreement they could make behind the veil of ignorance with respect to the principles of justice will be fair. Rawls also develops an account of law the Law of Peoples to show that the principles of justice will be universal in its reach. He claims that both reasonably just liberal and decent hierarchical peoples like the Muslim peoples of the utopian state, Kazanistan would accept the principles of justice. Rawls argues, however, that since a decent hierarchical society does not consider its members as free and equal citizens as a liberal society does, it cannot be as reasonable and just as a liberal society. So, liberal peoples must encourage decent peoples to recognize the advantages of having liberal institutions and try to convince them to become more liberal in order to have a reasonably just society. In this paper, I will argue that Rawlss accounts of the original position and the Law of Peoples show that unlike what Rawls contends, JAF is not only political but also metaphysical. I will suggest that since Rawlss accounts of JAF and person require some metaphysical assumptions, theists who necessarily hold comprehensive metaphysical claims on justice and person have a good reason to reject that they should step behind the veil of ignorance in order to construct a just social contract.

 In his book A Theory of Justice, John Rawls develops an account of justice, justice as fairness JAF, henceforth. In his later works, he claims that JAF is supposed to depend on neither philosophical nor religious claims but on political claims. So, the conception of justice he wishes to defend is political but not metaphysical. This political as well as moral in a specific sense conception of justice is supposed to apply to political, social, and economic institutions. By presenting JAF, Rawls aims to show how free and rational persons would hold the same conception of justice he defends if they have been invited to construct a just social contract. This would be the case, Rawls reasons, only if those persons determine the principles of justice as if they are in a purely hypothetical situation. Rawls calls this situation the original position and thinks that in the original position, parties and decision makers can be fair and impartial to construct a social contract if they can stand behind The Veil of Ignorance which is the main feature of the original position. The parties free and rational persons who stand behind the veil of ignorance know nothing about their place, class position, social status, intelligence, abilities, and the like in society. They do not know their conceptions of the good either. Since the parties are rational and capable of having a sense of justice, the fundamental agreement they could make behind the veil of ignorance with respect to the principles of justice will be fair. Rawls also develops an account of law the Law of Peoples to show that the principles of justice will be universal in its reach. He claims that both reasonably just liberal and decent hierarchical peoples like the Muslim peoples of the utopian state, Kazanistan would accept the principles of justice. Rawls argues, however, that since a decent hierarchical society does not consider its members as free and equal citizens as a liberal society does, it cannot be as reasonable and just as a liberal society. So, liberal peoples must encourage decent peoples to recognize the advantages of having liberal institutions and try to convince them to become more liberal in order to have a reasonably just society. In this paper, I will argue that Rawlss accounts of the original position and the Law of Peoples show that unlike what Rawls contends, JAF is not only political but also metaphysical. I will suggest that since Rawlss accounts of JAF and person require some metaphysical assumptions, theists who necessarily hold comprehensive metaphysical claims on justice and person have a good reason to reject that they should step behind the veil of ignorance in order to construct a just social contract.

 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice adlı eserinde hakkaniyet olarak adalet kavramını geliştirmektedir. Sonraki eserlerinde ise hakkaniyet olarak adaletin felsefi ya da dini iddialara değil de siyasi iddialara dayandığını öne sürmektedir. Dolayısıyla Rawlsun savunmak istediği adalet kavramı metafiziksel değil de siyasidir. Bu siyasi aynı zamanda özel bir manada ahlaki olan adalet kavramının siyasi, sosyal ve ekonomik kurumlara uygulanması beklenir. Rawls hakkaniyet olarak adalet kavramını ileri sürerek özgür ve rasyonel bireylerin adil bir sosyal anlaşma kurmaya davet edilirlerse aynı adalet kavramına sahip olacaklarını göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Rawlsa göre bu durum ancak bireylerin tamamıyla farazi bir durum içerisindelermiş gibi adaletin ilkelerini belirlemeleri halinde mümkündür. Rawls bu durumu orijinal pozisyon olarak adlandırır. Ona göre eğer partiler ve karar alıcılar orijinal pozisyonun temel özelliği olan Bilgisizlik Peçesinin arkasında kalabilirlerse orijinal pozisyonda hakkaniyetli ve tarafsız bir sosyal anlaşma yapabilirler. Bilgisizlik Peçesi arkasında duran partiler özgür ve rasyonel insanlar toplum içindeki yerlerini, sınıfsal pozisyonlarını, sosyal statülerini, zekalarını, kabiliyetlerini ve benzerlerini bilmezler. İyi kavramına da sahip değillerdir. Partiler, rasyonel oldukları ve adalet kavramına sahip olmaya muktedir oldukları için bilgisizlik peçesi arkasında yapacakları temel anlaşma adaletin temel prensipleri açısından hakkaniyetli olacaktır. Rawls aynı zamanda adaletin prensiplerinin sınırlarının evrensel olduğunu göstermek amacıyla bir hukuk tanımlaması İnsanların Hukuku geliştirir. Rawls makul bir şekilde liberal olan ve iyi hiyerarşik insanların da Kazanistan ütopyasının Müslümanları gibi adaletin temel prensiplerini kabul edeceğini ileri sürer. Ancak Rawls, iyi hiyerarşik bir toplumun kendi üyelerini liberal bir toplum kadar özgür ve eşit görmediği için onun liberal bir toplum gibi makul olamayacağını savunur. Böylelikle Rawlsa göre liberaller, iyi insanları liberal kurumlara sahip olmanın avantajlarını fark etmeye teşvik etmeli ve onları makul adaletli bir toplum için daha fazla liberal olmaları gerektiğine ikna etmelilerdir. Bu makalede Rawlsun orijinal pozisyon ve İnsanların Hukuku kavramlarının onun ulaşmak istediği sonucun aksine, hakkaniyet olarak adalet kavramının sadece siyası değil aynı zamanda metafiziksel olduğunu gösterdiğini savunuyorum. Rawlsun adalet ve ferde dair görüşlerinin metafiziksel varsayımlar gerektirdiği için adalet ve fert üzerine metafiziksel iddialara zorunlu olarak sahip olan teistlerin adil bir sosyal anlaşma yapma amacıyla bilgisizlik peçesi ardına geçmeyi reddetmeye dair iyi bir sebebi bulunmaktadır.

Makale detayları

Rawls’ ‘Justice as Fairness’: Not only Political but also Metaphysical

Yazarlar:

Ferhat Taşkın

Yayıncı:

Hitit University

Ana Başlıklar:

Din Felsefesi

Dergi:

Hitit İlahiyat Dergisi , pp.953-965

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

12/2023

Belge Dili:

İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.):

2001308590

pISSN:

2757-6949

Religious Studies

Liberalism

Justice

Social Contract

TheismDini Araştırmalar

Liberalizm

Adalet

Sosyal Anlaşma

Teizm

Sayı

Makale detayları

Yazarlar: Ferhat Taşkın

Yayıncı: Hitit University

Ana Başlıklar: Din Felsefesi

Dergi: Hitit İlahiyat Dergisi , pp.953-965

Belge Tipi: Makale

Yayın Tarihi: 12/2023

Belge Dili: İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.): 2001308590

pISSN: 2757-6949

Sayı

Yazarlar:

Ferhat Taşkın

Yayıncı:

Hitit University

Ana Başlıklar:

Din Felsefesi

Dergi:

Hitit İlahiyat Dergisi , pp.953-965

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

12/2023

Belge Dili:

İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.):

2001308590

pISSN:

2757-6949