Spinoza's Envıronmental Ethics Between Deep Ecology And Anthropocentrism Debates

Enes Dağ

Makale detayları

Spinoza's Envıronmental Ethics Between Deep Ecology And Anthropocentrism Debates

Yazarlar:

Enes Dağ

Yayıncı:

Mersin University

Ana Başlıklar:

Çevre Felsefesi | Etik | Modern Felsefe

Dergi:

Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi Issue 2, pp.254-281

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

10/2024

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001330330

pISSN:

2148-9327

Anahtar kelimeler:

Özet:

 One of the two prominent moral worldviews in environmental ethics is anthropocentric or human-centered view, which argues that the well-being of other species is for human well-being. The other is ecocentric or deep ecology movement, which expresses an egalitarian view of nature that does not assign humans a privileged position and does not allow the exploitation of other species for the human good. At first glance, Spinozas philosophy offers a favorable basis for both of these views. On the one hand, Spinoza states that man, like all other things, is a part of God or Nature, while at the same time he says that in order to preserve his own existence under the guidance of reason, man can take advantage of other natural beings, especially animals, for his own pleasure. There are two prominent names among environmental ethicists who seek a metaphysical basis for environmental ethics and see Spinoza as a source of inspiration. The first is Naess, one of the founders of deep ecology, who argues that Spinozas philosophy offers a favorable basis for an ecocentric view of nature. The other is Lloyd, an important Spinoza commentator, who argues that Spinozas system is more suitable for an anthropocentric ecological ethics because it emphasizes an  man-centered morality and does not consider other species as members of the moral community. This article first argues that two different views in Spinozas philosophy present a tension or problem when analyzed in terms of environmental ethics. The main claim of the article is that Spinozas philosophy offers a more favorable ground for an anthreposentric environmental ethics rather than a deep ecology. Accordingly, Naesss Spinozian view of deep ecology is analyzed and the problematic aspects of this justification are tried to be identified with alternative arguments. The article agrees with Lloyd in terms of Spinozian anthropocentrism, but claims to present a different argument for the resolution of the tension in question. Accordingly, it identifies the points where Lloyd is wrong in his argumentation and aims to alleviate the tension with an alternative reading of Spinoza.

 One of the two prominent moral worldviews in environmental ethics is anthropocentric or human-centered view, which argues that the well-being of other species is for human well-being. The other is ecocentric or deep ecology movement, which expresses an egalitarian view of nature that does not assign humans a privileged position and does not allow the exploitation of other species for the human good. At first glance, Spinozas philosophy offers a favorable basis for both of these views. On the one hand, Spinoza states that man, like all other things, is a part of God or Nature, while at the same time he says that in order to preserve his own existence under the guidance of reason, man can take advantage of other natural beings, especially animals, for his own pleasure. There are two prominent names among environmental ethicists who seek a metaphysical basis for environmental ethics and see Spinoza as a source of inspiration. The first is Naess, one of the founders of deep ecology, who argues that Spinozas philosophy offers a favorable basis for an ecocentric view of nature. The other is Lloyd, an important Spinoza commentator, who argues that Spinozas system is more suitable for an anthropocentric ecological ethics because it emphasizes an  man-centered morality and does not consider other species as members of the moral community. This article first argues that two different views in Spinozas philosophy present a tension or problem when analyzed in terms of environmental ethics. The main claim of the article is that Spinozas philosophy offers a more favorable ground for an anthreposentric environmental ethics rather than a deep ecology. Accordingly, Naesss Spinozian view of deep ecology is analyzed and the problematic aspects of this justification are tried to be identified with alternative arguments. The article agrees with Lloyd in terms of Spinozian anthropocentrism, but claims to present a different argument for the resolution of the tension in question. Accordingly, it identifies the points where Lloyd is wrong in his argumentation and aims to alleviate the tension with an alternative reading of Spinoza.

 One of the two prominent moral worldviews in environmental ethics is anthropocentric or human-centered view, which argues that the well-being of other species is for human well-being. The other is ecocentric or deep ecology movement, which expresses an egalitarian view of nature that does not assign humans a privileged position and does not allow the exploitation of other species for the human good. At first glance, Spinozas philosophy offers a favorable basis for both of these views. On the one hand, Spinoza states that man, like all other things, is a part of God or Nature, while at the same time he says that in order to preserve his own existence under the guidance of reason, man can take advantage of other natural beings, especially animals, for his own pleasure. There are two prominent names among environmental ethicists who seek a metaphysical basis for environmental ethics and see Spinoza as a source of inspiration. The first is Naess, one of the founders of deep ecology, who argues that Spinozas philosophy offers a favorable basis for an ecocentric view of nature. The other is Lloyd, an important Spinoza commentator, who argues that Spinozas system is more suitable for an anthropocentric ecological ethics because it emphasizes an  man-centered morality and does not consider other species as members of the moral community. This article first argues that two different views in Spinozas philosophy present a tension or problem when analyzed in terms of environmental ethics. The main claim of the article is that Spinozas philosophy offers a more favorable ground for an anthreposentric environmental ethics rather than a deep ecology. Accordingly, Naesss Spinozian view of deep ecology is analyzed and the problematic aspects of this justification are tried to be identified with alternative arguments. The article agrees with Lloyd in terms of Spinozian anthropocentrism, but claims to present a different argument for the resolution of the tension in question. Accordingly, it identifies the points where Lloyd is wrong in his argumentation and aims to alleviate the tension with an alternative reading of Spinoza.

 Çevre etiğinde ön plana çıkan iki ahlaki dünya görüşünden birisi, diğer türlerin refahının insan refahı için olduğunu savunan antroposentrik ya da insan-merkezli görüştür. Diğeri ise insana ayrıcalıklı bir konum tahsis etmeyen ve insani iyilik için diğer türlerin sömürülmesine izin vermeyen eşitlikçi bir doğa görüşünü ifade eden ekosentrik ya da derin ekoloji hareketidir. Spinoza felsefesi ilk bakışta bu iki görüş için de elverişli olabilecek bir dayanak sunar. Spinoza bir yandan insan tıpkı diğer tüm varlıklar gibi Tanrı ya da Doğanın bir parçasıdır derken aynı zamanda da kendi varlığını aklın rehberliğinde korumak için insanın başta hayvanlar olmak üzere diğer doğal varlıklardan kendi faydası uğruna yararlanabileceğini söyler. Çevre etiği için metafiziksel bir temel arayışında olan ve Spinozayı bir ilham kaynağı olarak gören çevre etikçileri arasında öne çıkmış iki isim vardır. Bunlardan birincisi, derin ekoloji görüşünün de kurucuları arasında olan ve Spinoza felsefesinin ekosentrik bir doğa görüşü için elverişli bir dayanak sunduğunu iddia eden Naesstir. Diğeri önemli bir Spinoza yorumcusu olan ve Spinoza sisteminin insan-merkezli bir ahlak görüşünü öne çıkardığı, diğer türleri ahlaki topluluğun bir üyesi olarak görmediği için antreposentrik bir ekolojik etik için daha uygun olduğunu savunan Lloyddur. Bu makale, öncelikle çevre etiği açısından değerlendirildiğinde Spinoza felsefesinde var olan iki farklı görüşün bir gerilim ya da sorun teşkil ettiğini savunmaktadır. Makalenin temel iddiası, Spinoza felsefesinin derin ekolojiden ziyade antreposentrik bir çevre etiği için daha elverişli bir zemin sunduğuna dairdir. Bu doğrultuda Naessin Spinozacı derin ekoloji görüşü irdelenmekte ve alternatif argümanlarla bu gerekçelendirmenin sorunlu yönleri saptanmaya çalışılmaktadır. Makale, Spinozacı antroposentrizm bakımından Lloyd ile aynı çizgide, ancak söz konusu gerilimin çözümü için farklı bir argüman sunma iddiasındadır. Bu doğrultuda Lloydun argümantasyonunda yanıldığı noktalar saptanmakta ve alternatif bir Spinoza okumasıyla gerilimin hafifletilmesi amaçlanmaktadır.

Makale detayları

Spinoza's Envıronmental Ethics Between Deep Ecology And Anthropocentrism Debates

Yazarlar:

Enes Dağ

Yayıncı:

Mersin University

Ana Başlıklar:

Çevre Felsefesi | Etik | Modern Felsefe

Dergi:

Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi Issue 2, pp.254-281

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

10/2024

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001330330

pISSN:

2148-9327

Environmental Ethics

Spinoza

Deep Ecology

Shallow Ecology

Anthropocentrism

Ecocentrism.Çevre Etiği

Spinoza

Derin Ekoloji

Sığ Ekoloji

Antroposentrizm

Ecosentrizm.

Sayı

Makale detayları

Yazarlar: Enes Dağ

Yayıncı: Mersin University

Ana Başlıklar: Çevre Felsefesi | Etik | Modern Felsefe

Dergi: Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi Issue 2, pp.254-281

Belge Tipi: Makale

Yayın Tarihi: 10/2024

Belge Dili: Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.): 2001330330

pISSN: 2148-9327

Sayı

Yazarlar:

Enes Dağ

Yayıncı:

Mersin University

Ana Başlıklar:

Çevre Felsefesi | Etik | Modern Felsefe

Dergi:

Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi Issue 2, pp.254-281

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

10/2024

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001330330

pISSN:

2148-9327