An Arendt-Kant Reading on the Problem of Political Judgment

Selda Salman

Makale detayları

An Arendt-Kant Reading on the Problem of Political Judgment

Yazarlar:

Selda Salman

Yayıncı:

Bursa Uludağ University

Ana Başlıklar:

Felsefe

Dergi:

Kaygı. Bursa Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Dergisi Vol.22 Issue 1, pp.289-318

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

3/2023

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001286513

pISSN:

2645-8950

Anahtar kelimeler:

Özet:

 The relationship between Arendt and Kant generally focuses on Kants Lectures on Political Philosophy, a compilation from the lectures Arendt gave at the New School in 1970, and here Arendt focuses on a reading of the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kritik der Urteilskraft from a political perspective. However, Kants influence on Arendt can be traced back to a much earlier period and spread through different works including the ideas matured in the Lectures. Although Arendt does not present a systematic integrity and is sometimes difficult to understand, she sees Kant as a milestone in her writings and acknowledges the importance of the basic principles of transcendental philosophy. For Arendt, Kant breaks the direct link between being and thinking, which is one of the most important transformations in the history of philosophy. Thus, Kant lays the foundations of the possibility of considering philosophy from a non-Platonic perspective that holds philosophy as a mere thinking activity in the monopoly of some privileged persons. In revealing these foundations, Arendt turns to Kants reflective judgments about the beautiful. In Arendt, the power of judgment comes to the fore as an ability that both facilitates the determination of the cause and offers a solution to the banality of evil, a notion that reached terrifying dimensions in the twentieth century. At the same time, the ability to judge stands at an important point in terms of not considering people in deterministic relations and giving them the responsibility of their own actions. Yet, as the power of judgment does not have a given, determined, objective structure, its development requires social communication and experience, which finds its possibility in a free environment where thoughts can circulate in the public sphere. In this article, I reveal the relationship between Arendt and Kant by taking the power of judgment as a central element to the possible solution of the problem of evil as a phenomenon that arises when thinking is insufficient in the field of politics and particular tendencies prevent judging. By revealing the Kantian origins of Arendts approach, I argue, contrary to the general claim, that Arendts interpretation of political philosophy is a creative but devoted interpretation of Kants philosophy.

 The relationship between Arendt and Kant generally focuses on Kants Lectures on Political Philosophy, a compilation from the lectures Arendt gave at the New School in 1970, and here Arendt focuses on a reading of the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kritik der Urteilskraft from a political perspective. However, Kants influence on Arendt can be traced back to a much earlier period and spread through different works including the ideas matured in the Lectures. Although Arendt does not present a systematic integrity and is sometimes difficult to understand, she sees Kant as a milestone in her writings and acknowledges the importance of the basic principles of transcendental philosophy. For Arendt, Kant breaks the direct link between being and thinking, which is one of the most important transformations in the history of philosophy. Thus, Kant lays the foundations of the possibility of considering philosophy from a non-Platonic perspective that holds philosophy as a mere thinking activity in the monopoly of some privileged persons. In revealing these foundations, Arendt turns to Kants reflective judgments about the beautiful. In Arendt, the power of judgment comes to the fore as an ability that both facilitates the determination of the cause and offers a solution to the banality of evil, a notion that reached terrifying dimensions in the twentieth century. At the same time, the ability to judge stands at an important point in terms of not considering people in deterministic relations and giving them the responsibility of their own actions. Yet, as the power of judgment does not have a given, determined, objective structure, its development requires social communication and experience, which finds its possibility in a free environment where thoughts can circulate in the public sphere. In this article, I reveal the relationship between Arendt and Kant by taking the power of judgment as a central element to the possible solution of the problem of evil as a phenomenon that arises when thinking is insufficient in the field of politics and particular tendencies prevent judging. By revealing the Kantian origins of Arendts approach, I argue, contrary to the general claim, that Arendts interpretation of political philosophy is a creative but devoted interpretation of Kants philosophy.

 The relationship between Arendt and Kant generally focuses on Kants Lectures on Political Philosophy, a compilation from the lectures Arendt gave at the New School in 1970, and here Arendt focuses on a reading of the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kritik der Urteilskraft from a political perspective. However, Kants influence on Arendt can be traced back to a much earlier period and spread through different works including the ideas matured in the Lectures. Although Arendt does not present a systematic integrity and is sometimes difficult to understand, she sees Kant as a milestone in her writings and acknowledges the importance of the basic principles of transcendental philosophy. For Arendt, Kant breaks the direct link between being and thinking, which is one of the most important transformations in the history of philosophy. Thus, Kant lays the foundations of the possibility of considering philosophy from a non-Platonic perspective that holds philosophy as a mere thinking activity in the monopoly of some privileged persons. In revealing these foundations, Arendt turns to Kants reflective judgments about the beautiful. In Arendt, the power of judgment comes to the fore as an ability that both facilitates the determination of the cause and offers a solution to the banality of evil, a notion that reached terrifying dimensions in the twentieth century. At the same time, the ability to judge stands at an important point in terms of not considering people in deterministic relations and giving them the responsibility of their own actions. Yet, as the power of judgment does not have a given, determined, objective structure, its development requires social communication and experience, which finds its possibility in a free environment where thoughts can circulate in the public sphere. In this article, I reveal the relationship between Arendt and Kant by taking the power of judgment as a central element to the possible solution of the problem of evil as a phenomenon that arises when thinking is insufficient in the field of politics and particular tendencies prevent judging. By revealing the Kantian origins of Arendts approach, I argue, contrary to the general claim, that Arendts interpretation of political philosophy is a creative but devoted interpretation of Kants philosophy.

 Arendt ve Kant arasındaki ilişki genellikle Arendtin 1970de New Schoolda verdiği derslerden derlenen Kantın Siyaset Felsefesi Üzerine Derslerine odaklanarak ele alınır ve Kant ile bağlantısı Arendtin bu derslerde referans verdiği üzere Yargıgücünün Eleştirisi Kritik der Urteilskraft merkezinde değerlendirilir. Ancak Arendt üzerindeki Kant etkisinin izleri, burada olgunlaşmış düşünceleri de kapsayacak şekilde çok daha erken dönemden itibaren sürülebilir. Sistematik bir bütünlük arz etmese ve anlaşılması zaman zaman güç de olsa Arendtin yazılarında Kantı bir milat olarak gördüğü ve transendental felsefenin temel ilkelerinin önemini teslim ettiği görülür. Arendt için Kant felsefe tarihinin en önemli dönüşümlerinden biri olan varlık ve düşünme arasındaki doğrudan bağlantıyı ve solayıısyla Platoncu bir yaklaşımla felsefeyi ayrıcalıklı insanların tekelinde salt bir düşünme faaliyeti olarak algılamayı böylelikle ortadan kaldırmış, ayrıca seküler, şimdi ve burada olana ilişkin politik yargıda bulunabilmenin imkanını ortaya çıkarabilecek temelleri atmıştır. Bu temellerin açığa çıkarılmasında Arendt yüzünü güzele ilişkin reflektif yargılarda betimlendiği şekliyle Kantın yargıgücüne dönmüştür. Arendtde yargıgücü, yirminci yüzyılda dehşet verici boyutlara ulaşan bir mefhum olan kötülüğün sıradanlığını anlamada hem neden tespitini kolaylaştıran hem bir çözüm sunan bir yeti olarak öne çıkar. Aynı zamanda yargı yetisi insanı deterministik bağlantılarla ele almama ve eylemlerdeki sorumluluğun ehliyetinin taşınması anlamında da önemli bir noktada durur. Ancak yargıgücü verili ve belirlenmiş, nesnel bir yapıya sahip olmadığı için gelişmesi toplumsal iletişimi ve deneyimi gerektirir. Bu da ancak düşüncelerin kamusal alanda dolaşıma girebildiği bir özgürlük ortamı ile mümkündür. Bu çalışmada Arendt ve Kant arasındaki ilişki bir hata tespiti olarak düşünmenin politika alanında yetersiz kalması ve tikel eğilimlerin düşünmenin önüne geçmesiyle ortaya çıkan bir olgu olarak kötülük problemine ilişkin yargıgücü merkezli çözüm önerisini ele alacaktır. Arendtin yaklaşımının Kantçı kökenleri ortaya konularak iddia edilenin aksine Arendtin siyaset felsefesi yorumunun Kant felsefesine bağlı, yaratıcı bir yorum olduğu ileri sürülecektir.

Makale detayları

An Arendt-Kant Reading on the Problem of Political Judgment

Yazarlar:

Selda Salman

Yayıncı:

Bursa Uludağ University

Ana Başlıklar:

Felsefe

Dergi:

Kaygı. Bursa Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Dergisi Vol.22 Issue 1, pp.289-318

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

3/2023

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001286513

pISSN:

2645-8950

Kant

Arendt

banality of evil

power of judgment

sensus communis

enlarged mentality

Kant

Arendt

kötülüğün sıradanlığı

yargıgücü

sensus communis

genişletilmiş zihniyet

Sayı

Makale detayları

Yazarlar: Selda Salman

Yayıncı: Bursa Uludağ University

Ana Başlıklar: Felsefe

Dergi: Kaygı. Bursa Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Dergisi Vol.22 Issue 1, pp.289-318

Belge Tipi: Makale

Yayın Tarihi: 3/2023

Belge Dili: Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.): 2001286513

pISSN: 2645-8950

Sayı

Yazarlar:

Selda Salman

Yayıncı:

Bursa Uludağ University

Ana Başlıklar:

Felsefe

Dergi:

Kaygı. Bursa Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Dergisi Vol.22 Issue 1, pp.289-318

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

3/2023

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001286513

pISSN:

2645-8950