Evil and God: A Reassessment of William L. Rowe’s Argument from Evil with Māturīdī’s Concepts of Wisdom and Exam

Hande Nur Bozbuğa

Makale detayları

Evil and God: A Reassessment of William L. Rowe’s Argument from Evil with Māturīdī’s Concepts of Wisdom and Exam

Yazarlar:

Hande Nur Bozbuğa

Yayıncı:

Kahramanmaras Sutcu Imam University

Ana Başlıklar:

Din Felsefesi

Dergi:

Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi Issue 45, pp.138-157

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

6/2025

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001352479

pISSN:

1304-4524

Anahtar kelimeler:

Özet:

 The evidentialist version of the problem of evil is based on the claim that the evils that exist in the world probabilistically rule out the existence of God. The main feature of this version is that it takes into account evils with qualities such as intense and horrendous and uses these evils as evidence against Gods existence. In this study, William L. Rowes argument from evidentialist evil will be analysed in terms of intense and horrendous evils. He defined such evils as evils that neither cause a greater good nor prevent a greater evil, and calls them pointless evils. Rowes argument for evil will be analysed from several perspectives in this study: Rowes distinction between evils, his exclusion of some evils from his argument, his construction of the distinction between evils in a way that is far from objectivity by using an empirical method such as observation, and his claim that even the evils he considers pointless deny the existence of God only as a possibility. These issues will be evaluated within the framework of Māturīdīs understanding of evil. This is because Māturīdī, as early as the 10th century in Islamic thought, dealt with evils in terms of their relationship with goodness like Rowe. However, Māturīdī firmly grounded his understanding of evil on a theological ground with the concepts of divine wisdom and exam. Rowe, on the other hand, could not sufficiently justify his argument philosophically because he supported his views with data based on individual observation and did not rationally justify his distinction between evils by explaining it with observation. However, Māturīdīs views have a dynamic structure that can be encountered even today in the theodicies put forward against atheist arguments for the problem of evil. As a matter of fact, it is possible to see the similarity of his views in some theist philosophers in contemporary philosophy, such as Stephen Wykstra, who criticises Rowes argument for the pointlessness of evils through the method of observation. Wykstras approach to the limitation of human knowledge in the face of Gods knowledge, which he expresses with the concept of reasonable epistemic access, finds a counterpart in Māturīdīs understanding of divine wisdom, which cannot be fully grasped by human reason. Moreover, Māturīdīs view that evils are for testing is similar to Alvin Plantingas defence of free will in contemporary philosophy. For both of them, human beings must have a free will for the sake of testing. The fact that approaches similar to Māturīdīa point of view are directed to Rowes argument by contemporary theists shows that Māturīdīs views have a sustainable structure. In addition, Rowes and Māturīdīs conceptions of evil have many common points. First, both of them evaluated evils according to their status in relation to goodness. Second, Māturīdī considered all evils and Rowe considered evils other than pointless evils as ontologically temporary. His understanding is intended to contribute to a re-reading of Rowes argument from evil.

 The evidentialist version of the problem of evil is based on the claim that the evils that exist in the world probabilistically rule out the existence of God. The main feature of this version is that it takes into account evils with qualities such as intense and horrendous and uses these evils as evidence against Gods existence. In this study, William L. Rowes argument from evidentialist evil will be analysed in terms of intense and horrendous evils. He defined such evils as evils that neither cause a greater good nor prevent a greater evil, and calls them pointless evils. Rowes argument for evil will be analysed from several perspectives in this study: Rowes distinction between evils, his exclusion of some evils from his argument, his construction of the distinction between evils in a way that is far from objectivity by using an empirical method such as observation, and his claim that even the evils he considers pointless deny the existence of God only as a possibility. These issues will be evaluated within the framework of Māturīdīs understanding of evil. This is because Māturīdī, as early as the 10th century in Islamic thought, dealt with evils in terms of their relationship with goodness like Rowe. However, Māturīdī firmly grounded his understanding of evil on a theological ground with the concepts of divine wisdom and exam. Rowe, on the other hand, could not sufficiently justify his argument philosophically because he supported his views with data based on individual observation and did not rationally justify his distinction between evils by explaining it with observation. However, Māturīdīs views have a dynamic structure that can be encountered even today in the theodicies put forward against atheist arguments for the problem of evil. As a matter of fact, it is possible to see the similarity of his views in some theist philosophers in contemporary philosophy, such as Stephen Wykstra, who criticises Rowes argument for the pointlessness of evils through the method of observation. Wykstras approach to the limitation of human knowledge in the face of Gods knowledge, which he expresses with the concept of reasonable epistemic access, finds a counterpart in Māturīdīs understanding of divine wisdom, which cannot be fully grasped by human reason. Moreover, Māturīdīs view that evils are for testing is similar to Alvin Plantingas defence of free will in contemporary philosophy. For both of them, human beings must have a free will for the sake of testing. The fact that approaches similar to Māturīdīa point of view are directed to Rowes argument by contemporary theists shows that Māturīdīs views have a sustainable structure. In addition, Rowes and Māturīdīs conceptions of evil have many common points. First, both of them evaluated evils according to their status in relation to goodness. Second, Māturīdī considered all evils and Rowe considered evils other than pointless evils as ontologically temporary. His understanding is intended to contribute to a re-reading of Rowes argument from evil.

 The evidentialist version of the problem of evil is based on the claim that the evils that exist in the world probabilistically rule out the existence of God. The main feature of this version is that it takes into account evils with qualities such as intense and horrendous and uses these evils as evidence against Gods existence. In this study, William L. Rowes argument from evidentialist evil will be analysed in terms of intense and horrendous evils. He defined such evils as evils that neither cause a greater good nor prevent a greater evil, and calls them pointless evils. Rowes argument for evil will be analysed from several perspectives in this study: Rowes distinction between evils, his exclusion of some evils from his argument, his construction of the distinction between evils in a way that is far from objectivity by using an empirical method such as observation, and his claim that even the evils he considers pointless deny the existence of God only as a possibility. These issues will be evaluated within the framework of Māturīdīs understanding of evil. This is because Māturīdī, as early as the 10th century in Islamic thought, dealt with evils in terms of their relationship with goodness like Rowe. However, Māturīdī firmly grounded his understanding of evil on a theological ground with the concepts of divine wisdom and exam. Rowe, on the other hand, could not sufficiently justify his argument philosophically because he supported his views with data based on individual observation and did not rationally justify his distinction between evils by explaining it with observation. However, Māturīdīs views have a dynamic structure that can be encountered even today in the theodicies put forward against atheist arguments for the problem of evil. As a matter of fact, it is possible to see the similarity of his views in some theist philosophers in contemporary philosophy, such as Stephen Wykstra, who criticises Rowes argument for the pointlessness of evils through the method of observation. Wykstras approach to the limitation of human knowledge in the face of Gods knowledge, which he expresses with the concept of reasonable epistemic access, finds a counterpart in Māturīdīs understanding of divine wisdom, which cannot be fully grasped by human reason. Moreover, Māturīdīs view that evils are for testing is similar to Alvin Plantingas defence of free will in contemporary philosophy. For both of them, human beings must have a free will for the sake of testing. The fact that approaches similar to Māturīdīa point of view are directed to Rowes argument by contemporary theists shows that Māturīdīs views have a sustainable structure. In addition, Rowes and Māturīdīs conceptions of evil have many common points. First, both of them evaluated evils according to their status in relation to goodness. Second, Māturīdī considered all evils and Rowe considered evils other than pointless evils as ontologically temporary. His understanding is intended to contribute to a re-reading of Rowes argument from evil.

 Kötülük probleminin delilci versiyonu, dünyada var olan kötülüklerin Tanrının varlığını olasılıksal olarak ortadan kaldırdığı iddiasına dayanmaktadır. Bu versiyonun temel özelliği, şiddetli ve korkunç gibi niteliklere sahip kötülükleri dikkate alması ve bu kötülükleri Tanrının varlığının aleyhine bir delil olarak kullanmasıdır. Bu çalışmada William L. Roweun delilci kötülük argümanındaki şiddetli ve korkunç kötülükler ele alınacaktır. O, bu tür kötülükleri daha büyük bir iyiliğe neden olan ya da daha büyük bir kötülüğü engellemeyen kötülükler olarak tanımlamış ve onları anlamsız kötülükler olarak adlandırmıştır. Roweun kötülük argümanı bu çalışmada birkaç açıdan ele alınacaktır: Kötülükler arasında ayrım yapması, bazı kötülükleri argümanının dışında bırakarak değerlendirmeye almaması, kötülük ayrımını gözlem gibi ampirik bir yöntem kullanarak objektiflikten uzak bir biçimde kurgulaması ve anlamsız gördüğü kötülüklerin bile Tanrının varlığını sadece bir olasılık olarak reddettiğini iddia etmesi şeklinde sıralanabilir. Bu hususlar, Mâtürîdînin kötülük anlayışı çerçevesinde değerlendirilecektir. Çünkü Mâtürîdî, İslâm düşüncesinde 10. yüzyıl gibi erken bir dönemde kötülükleri Rowe gibi iyiliklerle ilişkisi açısından ele almıştır. Bununla birlikte Mâtürîdî, kötülük anlayışını ilâhî hikmet ve imtihan kavramlarıyla teolojik bir zeminde sağlam bir şekilde temellendirmiştir. Rowe ise argümanını bireysel gözleme dayanan verilerle desteklemesi ve kötülükler arasında yaptığı ayrımı yine gözlemle açıklayarak rasyonel açıdan delillendirmemesi nedeniyle felsefî açıdan yeterince gerekçelendirememiştir. Oysa Mâtürîdînin görüşleri, günümüzde ateist kötülük problemi argümanlarına karşı ileri sürülen teodiselerde hala karşılaşılabilen dinamik bir yapıdadır. Nitekim onun görüşlerinin benzerini çağdaş felsefede Roweun kötülüklerin anlamlı olup olmadığını gözlem yöntemiyle ortaya koymasını eleştiren Stephen Wykstra gibi bazı teist filozoflarda görebilmek mümkündür. Wykstranın makul epistemik erişim kavramıyla ifade ettiği insan bilgisinin Tanrının bilgisi karşısındaki sınırlılığı yaklaşımı, Mâtürîdînin akılla bütünüyle kavranamayan ilâhî hikmet anlayışında karşılık bulmaktadır. Ayrıca Mâtürîdînin kötülüklerin imtihan için olduğunu ifade ettiği görüşü, çağdaş felsefede Alvin Plantinganın özgür irade savunmasıyla benzerdir. Her ikisi için de insan, imtihan için özgür bir iradeye sahip olmalıdır. Mâtürîdînin bakış açısına benzer yaklaşımların çağımızda teistler tarafından Roweun argümanına yöneltilmesi, Mâtürîdînin görüşlerinin sürdürülebilir bir yapıda olduğunu göstermektedir. Bunun yanı sıra Rowe ile Mâtürîdînin kötülük anlayışlarında birçok ortak nokta tespit edilebilmektedir. Birincisi, ikisi de kötülükleri iyilik karşısındaki durumuna göre değerlendirmiştir. İkincisi, Mâtürîdî kötülüklerin tamamını, Rowe ise anlamsız kötülükler dışında kalan kötülükleri ontolojik açıdan geçici olarak görmüştür. Onlardaki görüş farklılıkları, argümanlarının sonucuyla alakalıdır. Rowe, argümanıyla Tanrının olasılıksal olarak var olmadığını iddia ederken Mâtürîdî, kötülükleri Tanrıyı reddeden unsurlar olarak değil; hikmet ve imtihan kavramlarıyla açıklamakta ve insanın, imtihan için bulunduğu dünyada iyi ya da kötüyü tercih etmesi açısından ahirette ödül ya da cezayla muhatap olacağını ifade etmektedir. Onun bu anlayışının, Roweun kötülük argümanını yeniden okumaya katkı sağlaması amaçlanmaktadır.

Makale detayları

Evil and God: A Reassessment of William L. Rowe’s Argument from Evil with Māturīdī’s Concepts of Wisdom and Exam

Yazarlar:

Hande Nur Bozbuğa

Yayıncı:

Kahramanmaras Sutcu Imam University

Ana Başlıklar:

Din Felsefesi

Dergi:

Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi Issue 45, pp.138-157

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

6/2025

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001352479

pISSN:

1304-4524

Philosophy of Religion

Problem of Evil

Pointless Evil

William L. Rowe

MāturīdīDin Felsefesi

Kötülük Problemi

Anlamsız Kötülük

William L. Rowe

Mâtürîdî

Sayı

Makale detayları

Yazarlar: Hande Nur Bozbuğa

Yayıncı: Kahramanmaras Sutcu Imam University

Ana Başlıklar: Din Felsefesi

Dergi: Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi Issue 45, pp.138-157

Belge Tipi: Makale

Yayın Tarihi: 6/2025

Belge Dili: Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.): 2001352479

pISSN: 1304-4524

Sayı

Yazarlar:

Hande Nur Bozbuğa

Yayıncı:

Kahramanmaras Sutcu Imam University

Ana Başlıklar:

Din Felsefesi

Dergi:

Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi Issue 45, pp.138-157

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

6/2025

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001352479

pISSN:

1304-4524