Is Moore’s Moral Objectivist Argument Sufficient Against Moral Relativism?

Burhan Başarslan

Makale detayları

Is Moore’s Moral Objectivist Argument Sufficient Against Moral Relativism?

Yazarlar:

Burhan Başarslan

Yayıncı:

Siirt University

Ana Başlıklar:

Felsefe Tarihi (Diğer)

Dergi:

Marifetname Vol.11 Issue 1, pp.287-306

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

6/2024

Belge Dili:

İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.):

2001320283

pISSN:

2757-752X

Anahtar kelimeler:

Özet:

 This study aims to expose certain weaknesses in Moores moral objectivist argument against moral relativism and subjectivism. It suggests that a moral objectivist argument has to explain moral diversity against moral relativism. Moral relativism is one of the most critical debates in metaethics, and it can be interpreted in two different ways: one as moral realism and the other as moral anti-realism. Moral realism, when reduced to moral objectivism, excludes moral relativism and subjectivism beyond moral realism. I will refer to this interpretation as narrowed moral realism. But moral realism can be extended in an inclusive way such as moral subjectivism and relativism. I will refer to this as extended moral realism. Due to the focus of the study, I will introduce both extended moral realism and narrowed moral realism in the introduction section. Then, I will address G. E. Moores narrowed moral realism. I will criticize his arguments for their failure to explain the diversity of moral codes. Finally, I suggest that moral subjectivism and moral relativism can be appropriately addressed within extended moral realism. Contrary to Moores claims, I contend that moral relativism and moral subjectivism would be claims within moral realism. I also evaluate the two main claims from a moral realist perspective. Moral subjectivism claims that moral reality is constructed by an individuals mental state. Moral relativism argues that social codes of human conduct completely determine moral reality. In the first section of the study, I discussed moral relativism from a Moorean perspective, which asserts that there are self-evident and indefinable truths at the foundation of objective morality. The second section contends that if Moore is correct, however, it necessitates an explanation for why different cultures accept different moral codes. The third section argues the fact that Moore fails to provide any explanation for this. In the conclusion part, I claim that moral relativism and moral subjectivism can be viewed as moral realist theories based on the failure of Moores arguments.

 This study aims to expose certain weaknesses in Moores moral objectivist argument against moral relativism and subjectivism. It suggests that a moral objectivist argument has to explain moral diversity against moral relativism. Moral relativism is one of the most critical debates in metaethics, and it can be interpreted in two different ways: one as moral realism and the other as moral anti-realism. Moral realism, when reduced to moral objectivism, excludes moral relativism and subjectivism beyond moral realism. I will refer to this interpretation as narrowed moral realism. But moral realism can be extended in an inclusive way such as moral subjectivism and relativism. I will refer to this as extended moral realism. Due to the focus of the study, I will introduce both extended moral realism and narrowed moral realism in the introduction section. Then, I will address G. E. Moores narrowed moral realism. I will criticize his arguments for their failure to explain the diversity of moral codes. Finally, I suggest that moral subjectivism and moral relativism can be appropriately addressed within extended moral realism. Contrary to Moores claims, I contend that moral relativism and moral subjectivism would be claims within moral realism. I also evaluate the two main claims from a moral realist perspective. Moral subjectivism claims that moral reality is constructed by an individuals mental state. Moral relativism argues that social codes of human conduct completely determine moral reality. In the first section of the study, I discussed moral relativism from a Moorean perspective, which asserts that there are self-evident and indefinable truths at the foundation of objective morality. The second section contends that if Moore is correct, however, it necessitates an explanation for why different cultures accept different moral codes. The third section argues the fact that Moore fails to provide any explanation for this. In the conclusion part, I claim that moral relativism and moral subjectivism can be viewed as moral realist theories based on the failure of Moores arguments.

 This study aims to expose certain weaknesses in Moores moral objectivist argument against moral relativism and subjectivism. It suggests that a moral objectivist argument has to explain moral diversity against moral relativism. Moral relativism is one of the most critical debates in metaethics, and it can be interpreted in two different ways: one as moral realism and the other as moral anti-realism. Moral realism, when reduced to moral objectivism, excludes moral relativism and subjectivism beyond moral realism. I will refer to this interpretation as narrowed moral realism. But moral realism can be extended in an inclusive way such as moral subjectivism and relativism. I will refer to this as extended moral realism. Due to the focus of the study, I will introduce both extended moral realism and narrowed moral realism in the introduction section. Then, I will address G. E. Moores narrowed moral realism. I will criticize his arguments for their failure to explain the diversity of moral codes. Finally, I suggest that moral subjectivism and moral relativism can be appropriately addressed within extended moral realism. Contrary to Moores claims, I contend that moral relativism and moral subjectivism would be claims within moral realism. I also evaluate the two main claims from a moral realist perspective. Moral subjectivism claims that moral reality is constructed by an individuals mental state. Moral relativism argues that social codes of human conduct completely determine moral reality. In the first section of the study, I discussed moral relativism from a Moorean perspective, which asserts that there are self-evident and indefinable truths at the foundation of objective morality. The second section contends that if Moore is correct, however, it necessitates an explanation for why different cultures accept different moral codes. The third section argues the fact that Moore fails to provide any explanation for this. In the conclusion part, I claim that moral relativism and moral subjectivism can be viewed as moral realist theories based on the failure of Moores arguments.

 Bu makale Mooreun ahlaki görecelik ve öznelciliğe karşı ahlaki nesnelci argümanının zayıf olarak değerlendirilebilecek bazı yönlerini ele almaktadır. Bununla beraber çalışma, ahlaki nesnelci bir argümanın, ahlaki göreceliğe karşı ahlaki çeşitliliği açıklaması gerektiğini öne sürmektedir. Ahlaki görecelik metaetik alanındaki en kritik tartışmalardan biridir. Ahlaki görecelik; ahlaki gerçekçi ve ahlaki karşı-gerçekçi olarak iki farklı şekilde anlaşılabilir. Ahlaki gerçekçilik, ahlaki nesnelciliğe indirgendiğinde, ahlaki görecelik ve öznelcilik, ahlaki gerçekçiliğin dışında kalır. Çalışmada, bu yorum daraltılmış ahlaki gerçekçilik olarak adlandırılmıştır. Ancak ahlaki gerçekçilik ahlaki öznelcilik ve görecelik gibi kapsayıcı bir yolla genişletilebilir. Buna da genişletilmiş ahlaki gerçekçilik adı verilmiştir. Çalışmanın odağı sebebiyle giriş kısmında her ikisi de tanıtılacaktır. Ardından G. E. Mooreun daraltılmış ahlaki gerçekçiliği ele alınacaktır. Onun argümanları, ahlaki kodların çeşitliliğini açıklamadaki başarısızlığı yönüyle kritik edilecektir. Son olarak, ahlaki öznelcilik ve ahlaki göreceliğin genişletilmiş ahlaki gerçekçilik olarak ele alınabileceği öne sürülmektedir. Bu nedenle, Mooreun iddialarına rağmen ahlaki görecelik ve ahlaki öznelciliğin ahlaki gerçekçi iddialar olacağı savunulmaktadır. Ayrıca iki ana iddia da ahlaki gerçekçilik açısından değerlendirilmektedir: 1 Ahlaki öznelcilik, ahlaki gerçekliğin bireyin zihinsel durumu tarafından inşa edildiğini iddia eder. 2 Ahlaki görecelik, sosyal kodların tamamen ahlaki gerçekliği belirlediğini savunur. Birinci bölümde ahlaki görecelik, nesnel ahlakın temelinde apaçık ve tanımlanamaz gerçekler olduğunu savunan Moorecu bir perspektiften tartışılmaktadır. İkinci bölüm, Mooreun haklı olması durumunda, farklı kültürlerin neden farklı ahlaki kodları kabul ettiğini açıklaması gerektiğini iddia etmektedir. Üçüncü bölüm ise Mooreun buna yönelik herhangi bir açıklama sunmadığını ileri sürmektedir. Sonuç kısmında ahlaki görecelik ve ahlaki öznelciliğin Mooreun argümanlarının başarısızlığından yola çıkarak ahlaki gerçekçi teoriler olarak görülebileceği iddia edilmektedir.

Makale detayları

Is Moore’s Moral Objectivist Argument Sufficient Against Moral Relativism?

Yazarlar:

Burhan Başarslan

Yayıncı:

Siirt University

Ana Başlıklar:

Felsefe Tarihi (Diğer)

Dergi:

Marifetname Vol.11 Issue 1, pp.287-306

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

6/2024

Belge Dili:

İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.):

2001320283

pISSN:

2757-752X

History of Philosophy

G. E. Moore

Moral Realism

Moral Relativism

Moral Objectivism

Moral SubjectivismFelsefe Tarihi

G. E. Moore

Ahlaki Gerçekçilik

Ahlaki Görecilik

Ahlaki Nesnelcilik

Ahlaki Öznelcilik

Sayı

Makale detayları

Yazarlar: Burhan Başarslan

Yayıncı: Siirt University

Ana Başlıklar: Felsefe Tarihi (Diğer)

Dergi: Marifetname Vol.11 Issue 1, pp.287-306

Belge Tipi: Makale

Yayın Tarihi: 6/2024

Belge Dili: İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.): 2001320283

pISSN: 2757-752X

Sayı

Yazarlar:

Burhan Başarslan

Yayıncı:

Siirt University

Ana Başlıklar:

Felsefe Tarihi (Diğer)

Dergi:

Marifetname Vol.11 Issue 1, pp.287-306

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

6/2024

Belge Dili:

İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.):

2001320283

pISSN:

2757-752X