The Functionality of Regulatory Authorities that Lose Their Independence is Also Quested

N.A.

Makale detayları

The Functionality of Regulatory Authorities that Lose Their Independence is Also Quested

Yazarlar:

N.A.

Yayıncı:

Istanbul University

Ana Başlıklar:

Hukuk (Diğer)

Dergi:

İdare Hukuku ve İlimleri Dergisi Issue 23, pp.1-26

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

12/2024

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001338440

pISSN:

2687-2897

Anahtar kelimeler:

Özet:

 In contrast to the terms of regulatory and supervisory institutions or independent boards, which are generally used in Türkiye, we use the term of independent administrative authority IAA, Autorité administrative indépendante, as in French law, which we think better expresses their legal status. It is accepted that in sectors where public monopolies have been abolished because of privatizations, these organizations have emerged in parallel with the need to provide regulation and supervision to independent institutions. It is argued that the IMFs structural reform recommendations were also effective in the emergence of these institutions in Türkiye. However, it is also questionable to what extent such an administrative structure is compatible with the principle of separation of powers in parliamentary systems. We believe that the inability of the IAAs to fulfill their functions properly has contributed to their failure to prevent the practices that have occurred in Türkiye in recent years, which have caused financial losses to many people, and because we observe that they are also losing their independence due to certain legal regulations, we deemed it useful to address this issue. IAAs can be examined from two perspectives: structural and functional. Structurally, there is an autonomous institution and as a decision-making body, there is an independent board. The development in Türkiye has been in the direction that IAAs have lost their characteristics in both respects. Guarantees that are important for the independence of the decision-making body have completely disappeared, especially after 2018, because of powers delegated to the President. The President of the Republic of Türkiye may dismiss the appointed board members at any time and place. IAAs have the functions of regulating, auditing, imposing sanctions, and resolving sectoral disputes. Regulatory powers are different from the classical administrative regulatory authority and regulation as explained by the concept; in parallel with this, the existence of regulation law as soft law is accepted. However, it is controversial whether the transactions carried out in the application of this law, such as the warnings issued regarding certain attempts that will damage investors, are in the nature of transactions that can be the subject of lawsuit in the administrative judiciary. The fact that the IAAs in Türkiye do not use their auditing and supervisory powers in such attempts is also a subject of criticism.

 In contrast to the terms of regulatory and supervisory institutions or independent boards, which are generally used in Türkiye, we use the term of independent administrative authority IAA, Autorité administrative indépendante, as in French law, which we think better expresses their legal status. It is accepted that in sectors where public monopolies have been abolished because of privatizations, these organizations have emerged in parallel with the need to provide regulation and supervision to independent institutions. It is argued that the IMFs structural reform recommendations were also effective in the emergence of these institutions in Türkiye. However, it is also questionable to what extent such an administrative structure is compatible with the principle of separation of powers in parliamentary systems. We believe that the inability of the IAAs to fulfill their functions properly has contributed to their failure to prevent the practices that have occurred in Türkiye in recent years, which have caused financial losses to many people, and because we observe that they are also losing their independence due to certain legal regulations, we deemed it useful to address this issue. IAAs can be examined from two perspectives: structural and functional. Structurally, there is an autonomous institution and as a decision-making body, there is an independent board. The development in Türkiye has been in the direction that IAAs have lost their characteristics in both respects. Guarantees that are important for the independence of the decision-making body have completely disappeared, especially after 2018, because of powers delegated to the President. The President of the Republic of Türkiye may dismiss the appointed board members at any time and place. IAAs have the functions of regulating, auditing, imposing sanctions, and resolving sectoral disputes. Regulatory powers are different from the classical administrative regulatory authority and regulation as explained by the concept; in parallel with this, the existence of regulation law as soft law is accepted. However, it is controversial whether the transactions carried out in the application of this law, such as the warnings issued regarding certain attempts that will damage investors, are in the nature of transactions that can be the subject of lawsuit in the administrative judiciary. The fact that the IAAs in Türkiye do not use their auditing and supervisory powers in such attempts is also a subject of criticism.

 In contrast to the terms of regulatory and supervisory institutions or independent boards, which are generally used in Türkiye, we use the term of independent administrative authority IAA, Autorité administrative indépendante, as in French law, which we think better expresses their legal status. It is accepted that in sectors where public monopolies have been abolished because of privatizations, these organizations have emerged in parallel with the need to provide regulation and supervision to independent institutions. It is argued that the IMFs structural reform recommendations were also effective in the emergence of these institutions in Türkiye. However, it is also questionable to what extent such an administrative structure is compatible with the principle of separation of powers in parliamentary systems. We believe that the inability of the IAAs to fulfill their functions properly has contributed to their failure to prevent the practices that have occurred in Türkiye in recent years, which have caused financial losses to many people, and because we observe that they are also losing their independence due to certain legal regulations, we deemed it useful to address this issue. IAAs can be examined from two perspectives: structural and functional. Structurally, there is an autonomous institution and as a decision-making body, there is an independent board. The development in Türkiye has been in the direction that IAAs have lost their characteristics in both respects. Guarantees that are important for the independence of the decision-making body have completely disappeared, especially after 2018, because of powers delegated to the President. The President of the Republic of Türkiye may dismiss the appointed board members at any time and place. IAAs have the functions of regulating, auditing, imposing sanctions, and resolving sectoral disputes. Regulatory powers are different from the classical administrative regulatory authority and regulation as explained by the concept; in parallel with this, the existence of regulation law as soft law is accepted. However, it is controversial whether the transactions carried out in the application of this law, such as the warnings issued regarding certain attempts that will damage investors, are in the nature of transactions that can be the subject of lawsuit in the administrative judiciary. The fact that the IAAs in Türkiye do not use their auditing and supervisory powers in such attempts is also a subject of criticism.

 Türkiyede genellikle kullanılan düzenleyici ve denetleyici kurumlar veya bağımsız kurullar kavramları karşılığında, hukuki statülerini daha iyi ifade ettiğini düşündüğümüz, Fransız hukukundaki bağımsız idari otorite BİO, Autorité administrative indépendante kavramını kullanmaktayız. Özelleştirmeler sonucu kamu tekellerinin kaldırıldığı sektörlerde düzenleme ve denetimin bağımsız kuruluşlara verilmesi gereksinimine koşut olarak bu kuruluşların ortaya çıktığı kabul edilmektedir. Türkiyede bu kuruluşların ortaya çıkmasında İMFnin yapısal reform tavsiyelerinin de etkili olduğu savunulmaktadır. Ancak, bu tür bir idari yapılanmanın parlamanter sistemlerde güçler ayrılığı ilkesi ile ne ölçüde bağdaştığı da sorgulanmaktadır. Türkiyede, son yıllarda yaşanan ve çok sayıda kişinin maddi açıdan zararlarına yol açan uygulamaların engellenememesinde, BİOların işlevlerini gereğince yerine getirememesinin de payı olduğunu düşündüğümüzden ve ayrıca, bazı hukuki düzenlemelerle bağımsızlıklarını da kaybetmekte olduklarını gözlediğimizden bu konuyu ele almakta yarar gördük. BİOlar yapısal ve işlevsel olmak üzere iki açıdan incelenebilir. Yapısal olarak özerk kurum; karar organı olarak da bağımsız kurul vardır. Türkiyedeki gelişme, BİOların her iki açıdan da özelliklerini yitirmeleri yönünde olmuştur. Karar organının bağımsızlığı için önemli olan güvenceler, özellikle 2018 sonrası Cumhurbaşkanına verilen yetkiler sonucu tümüyle kalkmıştır. Cumhurbaşkanı serbestçe atadığı kurul üyelerini istediği zaman görevden alabilmektedir. BİOlar, düzenleme, denetleme, yaptırım uygulama ve sektörel uyuşmazlıkları çözme işlevlerine sahiptir. Düzenleme yetkileri klasik idari düzenleme yetkisinden farklı olup regülasyon kavramı ile açıklanmakta; buna koşut ve soft law olarak, regülasyon hukukunun varlığı kabul edilmektedir. Ancak, bu hukukun uygulamasında yapılan işlemlerin, örneğin yatırımcıları zarara uğratacak bazı girişimler konusunda çıkarılan uyarıların idari yargıda dava konusu olabilecek işlem nitelikleri tartışmalıdır. Türkiyede BİOların bu tür girişimler konusunda denetim ve gözetim yetkilerini kullanmamaları da eleştiri konusudur.

Makale detayları

The Functionality of Regulatory Authorities that Lose Their Independence is Also Quested

Yazarlar:

N.A.

Yayıncı:

Istanbul University

Ana Başlıklar:

Hukuk (Diğer)

Dergi:

İdare Hukuku ve İlimleri Dergisi Issue 23, pp.1-26

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

12/2024

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001338440

pISSN:

2687-2897

Independent Administrative Authorities

Soft Law

Independence

Regulatory Actions

Functional CharacteristicsBağımsız İdari Otoriteler

Soft Law

Bağımsızlık

Regülasyon İşlemleri

İşlevsel Özellikler

Sayı

Makale detayları

Yazarlar: N.A.

Yayıncı: Istanbul University

Ana Başlıklar: Hukuk (Diğer)

Dergi: İdare Hukuku ve İlimleri Dergisi Issue 23, pp.1-26

Belge Tipi: Makale

Yayın Tarihi: 12/2024

Belge Dili: Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.): 2001338440

pISSN: 2687-2897

Sayı

Yazarlar:

N.A.

Yayıncı:

Istanbul University

Ana Başlıklar:

Hukuk (Diğer)

Dergi:

İdare Hukuku ve İlimleri Dergisi Issue 23, pp.1-26

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

12/2024

Belge Dili:

Türkçe

Document ID (Org No.):

2001338440

pISSN:

2687-2897