An Analysis of the Debate between al-Ṭūsī and  al-Kātibī on Contingency Argument

Mehmet Tayfun Küçük

Makale detayları

An Analysis of the Debate between al-Ṭūsī and al-Kātibī on Contingency Argument

Yazarlar:

Mehmet Tayfun Küçük

Yayıncı:

Ankara University

Ana Başlıklar:

İslam Felsefesi

Dergi:

Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi Vol.65 Issue 1, pp.261-287

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

5/2024

Belge Dili:

İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.):

2001318606

pISSN:

1301-0522

Anahtar kelimeler:

Özet:

 This article addresses a written debate between Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī d. 675 AH1277 AD and Nasīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī d. 672 AH1274 AD on the contingency argument, which is one of the most well-known proofs offered in history regarding the existence of God. According to thinkers before al-Kātibī, the contingency argument verifies the Necessary Being, and then it debunks the possibility of infinite regress. By earlier thinkers, al-Kātibī means especially Avicenna d. 428 AH1037 AD and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī d. 6061210. According to al-Kātibī, the notion of the Necessary Being was proved through the contingency argument they put forward, but a careful examination of their arguments indicates that they presented no definitive proof refuting the notion of infinite regress. Therefore, according to al-Kātibī, what Avicenna and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī claimed to prove the impossibility of infinite regress through the contingency argument is not valid. As al-Ṭūsī responded to al-Kātibīs objections, a debate consisting of three letters from each side emerged between them. At the end of the debate, al-Kātibī found al-Ṭūsīs explanations reasonable, and he admitted that they were correct. However, the parties did not mention the agreed version of the argument at the end of the debate. For this reason, I added this agreed argument at the end of this study in accordance with the parties declarations. The purpose of the present study is to analyse this debate in its natural order and to eliminate technical ambiguities it involves, defending Avicennas, al-Rāzīs, and al-Ṭūsīs philosophical position in the contingency argument about proving the impossibility of infinite regress through the argument. On the other hand, this debate is an epitome of the classical debate tradition. It is also significant in the sense that it reveals one of the best examples of the interdisciplinary discussion between kalām and philosophical schools, and the application of classical logic to theoretical disciplines. As a result of our analyses of the debate, we have concluded that the objections brought by al-Kātibī against the contingency argument in parallel with the conclusion of the debate accepted by the parties, maintain the contingency argument. According to this conclusion, the contingency argument is a proof which invalidates infinite regress while proving the existence of the Necessary Being.

 This article addresses a written debate between Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī d. 675 AH1277 AD and Nasīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī d. 672 AH1274 AD on the contingency argument, which is one of the most well-known proofs offered in history regarding the existence of God. According to thinkers before al-Kātibī, the contingency argument verifies the Necessary Being, and then it debunks the possibility of infinite regress. By earlier thinkers, al-Kātibī means especially Avicenna d. 428 AH1037 AD and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī d. 6061210. According to al-Kātibī, the notion of the Necessary Being was proved through the contingency argument they put forward, but a careful examination of their arguments indicates that they presented no definitive proof refuting the notion of infinite regress. Therefore, according to al-Kātibī, what Avicenna and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī claimed to prove the impossibility of infinite regress through the contingency argument is not valid. As al-Ṭūsī responded to al-Kātibīs objections, a debate consisting of three letters from each side emerged between them. At the end of the debate, al-Kātibī found al-Ṭūsīs explanations reasonable, and he admitted that they were correct. However, the parties did not mention the agreed version of the argument at the end of the debate. For this reason, I added this agreed argument at the end of this study in accordance with the parties declarations. The purpose of the present study is to analyse this debate in its natural order and to eliminate technical ambiguities it involves, defending Avicennas, al-Rāzīs, and al-Ṭūsīs philosophical position in the contingency argument about proving the impossibility of infinite regress through the argument. On the other hand, this debate is an epitome of the classical debate tradition. It is also significant in the sense that it reveals one of the best examples of the interdisciplinary discussion between kalām and philosophical schools, and the application of classical logic to theoretical disciplines. As a result of our analyses of the debate, we have concluded that the objections brought by al-Kātibī against the contingency argument in parallel with the conclusion of the debate accepted by the parties, maintain the contingency argument. According to this conclusion, the contingency argument is a proof which invalidates infinite regress while proving the existence of the Necessary Being.

 This article addresses a written debate between Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī d. 675 AH1277 AD and Nasīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī d. 672 AH1274 AD on the contingency argument, which is one of the most well-known proofs offered in history regarding the existence of God. According to thinkers before al-Kātibī, the contingency argument verifies the Necessary Being, and then it debunks the possibility of infinite regress. By earlier thinkers, al-Kātibī means especially Avicenna d. 428 AH1037 AD and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī d. 6061210. According to al-Kātibī, the notion of the Necessary Being was proved through the contingency argument they put forward, but a careful examination of their arguments indicates that they presented no definitive proof refuting the notion of infinite regress. Therefore, according to al-Kātibī, what Avicenna and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī claimed to prove the impossibility of infinite regress through the contingency argument is not valid. As al-Ṭūsī responded to al-Kātibīs objections, a debate consisting of three letters from each side emerged between them. At the end of the debate, al-Kātibī found al-Ṭūsīs explanations reasonable, and he admitted that they were correct. However, the parties did not mention the agreed version of the argument at the end of the debate. For this reason, I added this agreed argument at the end of this study in accordance with the parties declarations. The purpose of the present study is to analyse this debate in its natural order and to eliminate technical ambiguities it involves, defending Avicennas, al-Rāzīs, and al-Ṭūsīs philosophical position in the contingency argument about proving the impossibility of infinite regress through the argument. On the other hand, this debate is an epitome of the classical debate tradition. It is also significant in the sense that it reveals one of the best examples of the interdisciplinary discussion between kalām and philosophical schools, and the application of classical logic to theoretical disciplines. As a result of our analyses of the debate, we have concluded that the objections brought by al-Kātibī against the contingency argument in parallel with the conclusion of the debate accepted by the parties, maintain the contingency argument. According to this conclusion, the contingency argument is a proof which invalidates infinite regress while proving the existence of the Necessary Being.

 Bu makale, Necmeddin Kātibī ö. 6751277 ve Nasreddin Ṭūsī ö. 6721274 arasında, Tanrının varlığı hakkında tarihte getirilen en meşhur delillerden biri olan imkân delili hususunda gerçekleşen yazılı bir münâzarayı ele almaktadır. Kātibīden önceki düşünürlere göre imkân delili, Zorunlu Varlıkı kanıtladıktan sonra teselsülün imkânını da çürütmektedir. Kātibīnin önceki düşünürlerden kastı özellikle İbn Sīnā ö. 4281037 ve Fahreddin Rāzīdir ö. 6061210. Kātibīye göre onların ortaya koyduğu imkân delili Zorunlu Varlıkı ispatlamaktadır; fakat argümanlar üzerinde dikkatli bir inceleme, onların teselsülü iptal etmek hususunda kesin bir kanıt ortaya koyamadıklarını göstermektedir. Bu yüzden Kātibīye göre onların imkân delili aracılığıyla teselsülün imkansızlığını ispat ettiklerine dair iddiaları geçerli değildir. Ṭūsīnin Kātibīnin bu itirazlarına cevap vermesiyle, aralarında üçer mektuptan oluşan bir münâzara başlar. Tartışmanın sonunda Kātibī, Ṭūsīnin açıklamalarını mâkul bulur ve doğruluklarını itiraf eder. Fakat tartışmanın sonunda taraflar, argümanın uzlaşılan versiyonunu yeniden zikretmezler. Bu sebeple, tarafların beyanları çerçevesinde uzlaşılan argümanı bu çalışmanın son kısmına ekledik. Elinizdeki çalışmanın amacı sözü geçen münâzarayı doğal düzeni içerisinde analiz etmek, içerdiği teknik kapalılıkları gidermek ve İbn Sīnā, Fahreddin Rāzī ve Nasreddin Ṭūsīnin imkân delili aracılığıyla teselsülün imkansızlığını kanıtlama hususundaki felsefî pozisyonlarını savunmaktır. Diğer taraftan bu tartışma, klasik münâzara geleneğinin somut bir örneği olması ve kelam ile felsefe okulları arasındaki disiplinlerarası tartışma geleneğini ve klasik mantığın teorik disiplinlere uygulanışını en güzel yansıtan örneklerden biri olması sebebiyle önemlidir. Münâzaraya dair analizlerimiz neticesinde münâzaranın taraflarca da kabul edilen sonucuna paralel olarak Kātibīnin imkân deliline karşı getirdiği itirazların imkân deliline zarar vermediği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Bu sonuca göre imkân delili, Zorunlu Varlıkın varlığını ispatlamasının yanında teselsülün imkansızlığını da kanıtlayan bir delildir.

Makale detayları

An Analysis of the Debate between al-Ṭūsī and al-Kātibī on Contingency Argument

Yazarlar:

Mehmet Tayfun Küçük

Yayıncı:

Ankara University

Ana Başlıklar:

İslam Felsefesi

Dergi:

Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi Vol.65 Issue 1, pp.261-287

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

5/2024

Belge Dili:

İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.):

2001318606

pISSN:

1301-0522

Philosophy

God

Debate

Infinite Regress

Contingency

Avicenna

al-Ṭūsī

al-Kātibī.Felsefe

Tanrı

Münâzara

Teselsül

İmkân

İbn Sīnā

Ṭūsī

Kātibī.

Sayı

Makale detayları

Yazarlar: Mehmet Tayfun Küçük

Yayıncı: Ankara University

Ana Başlıklar: İslam Felsefesi

Dergi: Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi Vol.65 Issue 1, pp.261-287

Belge Tipi: Makale

Yayın Tarihi: 5/2024

Belge Dili: İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.): 2001318606

pISSN: 1301-0522

Sayı

Yazarlar:

Mehmet Tayfun Küçük

Yayıncı:

Ankara University

Ana Başlıklar:

İslam Felsefesi

Dergi:

Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi Vol.65 Issue 1, pp.261-287

Belge Tipi:

Makale

Yayın Tarihi:

5/2024

Belge Dili:

İngilizce

Document ID (Org No.):

2001318606

pISSN:

1301-0522